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A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES: CANADA'S
RESPONSE TO THE PEER-TO-PEER CRISIS
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED
STATES
Fara Tabatabai*
We must stop thinking of intellectual property as an absolute and
start thinking of it as a function-as a process, which, if it is to be
successful, must meet diverse aims: the assurance of a fair reward to
creators and inventors and the encouragement of research and
creativity, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the widest
possible dissemination of the ideas and products of which the world,
and all the individuals in it, have such great need!
INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 2004, federal agents raided five private residences in
Texas, Wisconsin, and New York.2 These residences were not drug
houses or brothels, but the suspected locations of peer-to-peer
("P2P") file-sharing3 hubs that formed an online system called the
Underground Network.4 Using these file-sharing hubs, computer
users were able to exchange copyrighted songs and movies
instantaneously. FBI agents had been monitoring the residences as
part of a sting operation for months, culminating in a final raid to
seize computers, software, and related equipment at each of the
homes.6
The targeting of the Underground Network seems somewhat odd,
given that it is not, by any stretch of the imagination, among the most
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.
1. The Honourable Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin, Supreme Court of
Canada, Intellectual Property: What's It All About?, in Trade-Marks Law of Canada
397 (Gordon F. Henderson ed., 1993).
2. Terry Frieden, Feds Launch Internet Crime Crackdown, CNN.com, Aug. 26,
2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/08/26/cybercrime.probe/.
3. For a full definition of P2P file sharing and how it works, see infra notes 152-
63 and accompanying text.
4. Jonathan Krim, Suspected File-Sharing 'Hubs' Raided, Wash. Post, Aug. 26,
2004, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33959-
2004Aug25.html.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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popular file-sharing services on the Internet. To the contrary, the
popular P2P network Kazaa boasts over sixty million users worldwide,
with twenty-two million of those users residing in the United States.7
In contrast, the Underground Network had only 7000 users at the time
of the raid.8 Nevertheless, the Underground Network presented the
perfect service out of which to make an example. In a statement
made the same day as the raids, then United States Attorney General
John Ashcroft announced Operation Digital Gridlock, an ongoing
federal criminal investigation of P2P networks.9 Ashcroft stated that
the Underground Network raids served as a
clear message to online thieves who steal the hard work and
innovation of others... [and] to those who think nothing of
downloading those stolen goods to their computers or MP3 players.
You can pay the fair value for music, movies, software and games
like every other consumer, or you can pay an even higher price
when you are caught committing online theft.10
Unfortunately, the message was lost on the Underground Network.
On the same evening as the raids, the Network was up and running
again, having transferred its operations to computers overseas."
This story illustrates two interesting points. First, it is an excellent
example of the strict, no-nonsense approach that the United States
has taken to P2P file sharing. Congress, for example, has responded
to the massive rates of copyright infringement on P2P networks by
roundly condemning file sharing as responsible for everything from
child pornography 2 to terrorism.1" Meanwhile, the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA") has filed hundreds of
John Doe lawsuits against individual file sharers for alleged copyright
infringement.14 It has also filed contributory infringement claims
against P2P networks, with varying degrees of success. 5
7. Alice Kao, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena Provision of the
DMCA, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 405, 408 n.25 (2004).
8. Krim, supra note 4.
9. Prepared Statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Digital Gridlock
Announcement (Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/AshcroftRemarks082504.htm.
10. Id.
11. Krim, supra note 4, at El.
12. Gen. Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, Comm. on Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, File-Sharing
Programs: Peer-to-Peer Networks Provide Ready Access to Child Pornography,
GAO-03-351 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-
351; see also House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on P2P Smut, Tech L.J. (May 6,
2004), at http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2004/20040506.asp.
13. International Copyright Piracy: A Growing Problem with Links to Organized
Crime and Terrorism: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
11-12 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_househearings&docid=f:85643.wais.pdf.
14. In June 2004, the RIAA filed 482 John Doe lawsuits against file sharers,
bringing the total number of people it had sued to 3429. See John Borland, RIAA
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The second point that the above story illustrates is that all of these
efforts may ultimately accomplish nothing, except the shifting of P2P
technology into countries with more liberal rules on file sharing.16 The
time between the FBI raids and the time when the Underground
Network could begin operating again as if nothing had happened was
only a matter of hours." In the borderless world of the Internet,
copyright enforcement either occurs on a global scale or not at all.
Thus, it was particularly shocking for copyright holders in the
United States to read the headline on the morning of March 31, 2004:
"File-sharing is legal in Canada!"' 8 The headlines referred to BMG
Canada Inc. v. John Doe,9 a controversial Canadian ruling in which a
federal court judge declared that P2P file sharing-the online
exchange of copyrighted works-does not constitute infringement
under the Canadian Copyright Act.z ° The global reaction was
instantaneous. File sharers around the world rejoiced."z  The
Canadian recording industry vowed to appeal.22 Commentators
worried about Canada becoming a safe haven for P2P technologies. 3
Takes Hundreds More 'John Does' to Court, CNET News.com, June 22, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/2100-10273-5243587.html.
15. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir.) (holding P2P network Grokster not liable for contributory infringement), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding P2P network Aimster liable for contributory infringement), cert.
denied sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding P2P
network Napster liable for contributory infringement).
16. For a discussion of the problems posed by P2P technologies moving offshore,
see infra note 295.
17. Krim, supra note 4, at El.
18. See, e.g., Janet McFarland, Ruling Deals Blow to Music Industry, Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Apr. 1, 2004, at B4, available at www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/
ArticleNews/print/GAM/20040401/RMUSICPRIVACY01; John Borland, Judge: File
Sharing Legal in Canada, CNET News.com, Mar. 31, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5182641.html; Online Music Swapping Legal: Court,
CBC News, Mar. 31, 2004, at
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2004/03/31/download courtO4O33l.html;
Cynthia L. Webb, Canada Puts Arctic Chill on Music Industry, Wash. Post Online,
Apr. 1, 2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A41679-
2004Aprl?language=printer.
19. [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241 (Trial Div.) (Can.).
20. Id. at 258-61.
21. See, e.g., Thread Response to Zeropaid Forums, General Computing, P2P
Politics, File Sharing Is Now LEGAL in Canada!, at
http://www.zeropaid.com/bbs/archive/index.php/t-19252 (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
22. The industry, true to its word, filed an appeal on April 13, 2004 with the
Federal Court of Appeal of Canada. Fed. Court of Appeal of Can., Proceedings
Queries-Additional Information on A-203-04, at http://www.fca-
caf.gc.ca/IndexingQueries/infp-morenfo-e.php?A-203-04 (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
The court set April 20, 2005 as the first date for the two-day hearing. Fed. Court of
Appeal of Can., Hearing List, at http://www.fca-
caf.gc.calbusiness/hearings/a full-e.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
23. See, e.g., Jeremy N. Geltzer, The New Pirates of the Caribbean: How Data
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At the core of each of these reactions was one basic question: How
could file sharing, so obviously and egregiously an act of copyright
infringement in the United States, be legal in Canada?
The answer lies in the recent shifts of focus in the copyright laws of
both countries. While the American copyright regime has become
increasingly rigid, and increasingly focused on expanding the rights
and remedies of copyright holders,24 the Canadian copyright regime
has become increasingly flexible.25 Rather than try to stop file sharing
altogether, Canada has focused on achieving a balance between the
rights of copyright holders and the rights of users, and on developing
unique solutions that may ultimately legitimize P2P, while
compensating artists. 6
The United States has taken a different approach. Currently before
Congress are three bills which target both individual file sharers and
file-sharing technologies.27  Each of these bills, if passed, would
expand the rights and remedies of copyright holders, without any
corresponding expansion of users' rights, or any protections for
technological innovations. 2
8
In formulating this legislation, Congress has followed the American
courts in failing to consider alternative analyses to the problems that
P2P has engendered. At this critical time, before this legislation
passes, Congress must shift its focus from a copyright law that
exclusively benefits creators, to a copyright law that benefits all
members of society. At a time when the United States appears to
have traded flexibility for the enforcement of outmoded rules, the
Canadian example introduces an alternate way of thinking about P2P.
Now, at a time when the American response to P2P is threatening to
undermine the rights of users, the Canadian example sheds some light
on the path back to copyright balance.
Part I of this Note examines the main features of American and
Canadian copyright law, and discusses how both countries have
reacted to the challenges of the digital age. Part II analyzes how P2P
both fits into and modifies the emerging copyright regimes of the
United States and Canada. Finally, Part III argues that America's
Havens Can Provide Safe Harbors on the Internet Beyond Governmental Reach, 10
Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 433, 442-43 (2004); Doug Alexander & Peter Ford, New Haven
for Free Music: Canada, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 2, 2004, at 6 (stating that the
ability of Canadians to file share without impunity will cause "a lot of concern" in the
United States), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0402/pO6sOl-woam.html.
24. See infra notes 302-49, 417-41 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 442-55 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 375-474 and accompanying text.
27. These three bills are the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S.
2560, 108th Cong. (2004); the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, H.R.
4077, 108th Cong. (2004); and the Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and
Expropriation Act of 2004, S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004). For a discussion of these
bills, see infra notes 305-49 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 400-41 and accompanying text.
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approach has failed to maintain an acceptable balance between the
interests of copyright holders and the public interest in access to P2P
technologies. Part III also advocates the application of the Canadian
approach-including an explicit focus on copyright balance and a
willingness to adapt existing regimes to new problems-to the
American context, in the hopes that Congress will reconsider its
approach to P2P before it legislates P2P out of existence.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA
As copyright has progressed into the modern technological age, it
has adapted to a variety of new innovations that present an increased
capacity for both creative and infringing activity.29 The law's response
to these innovations has produced shifts in the way that courts and
legislatures think about copyright. Part I.A explores these shifts, first
by examining the theoretical underpinnings of copyright law, and then
by discussing recent changes in Canada towards the expansion of
users' rights. Part I.B discusses the impact of past technological
innovations on the copyright regimes in both the United States and
Canada, and examines how these responses set the stage for the
battles that are currently raging around P2P.
A. Features of American and Canadian Copyright Law
Many of the unique features of American and Canadian copyright
law stem from underlying theoretical justifications for intellectual
property. There are essentially three major theories that inform
copyright law: the utilitarian theory,30 the natural rights theory,31 and
the moral rights theory.32 To the extent that the United States and
Canada have modeled their copyright laws after one or more of these
theories, their intellectual property regimes are either more or less
protective of the rights of creators. The Canadian regime was
traditionally more protective of copyrights, and less protective of
users' rights.33 Recently, however, this has begun to change, as
fundamental shifts in Canadian law have brought the copyright regime
more in line with the utilitarian notion of balance.34
29. The invention of radio, cable television, and the VCR all threatened existing
notions of copyright. See infra notes 91-112 and accompanying text. In addition, the
advent of "home taping" on audio cassette recorders presented a significant challenge
to copyright law, which both Canadian and American legislatures addressed by
legalizing private copying. See infra notes 114-51 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
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1. Justifications for Copyright
Of the three primary theories for the existence of copyright, the one
that has found the most favor in the United States is the utilitarian
theory. According to this theory, copyright is a bargain struck
between private and public interests,35 which grants authors a limited
statutory monopoly as an incentive for them to create.36 The goal of
copyright, however, is not to reward authors, but rather to ensure the
enrichment of the public domain.37
The roots of this theory in the American consciousness stretch back
to the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power
"to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."38  In accordance with this
theory, when revising the Copyright Act in 1909, Congress stated that
copyright did not validate any natural right of the author, but rather
existed solely for the public welfare.3 9
The Supreme Court endorsed this view of copyright in its landmark
decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.4"
There, the Court noted that:
Congress... has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors
in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.
Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the
other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended
repeatedly.41
The Sony Court thus recognized the centrality of a copyright
balance to the utilitarian principles underlying intellectual property
law. This is a recognition that American copyright, at its origin,
existed primarily to benefit the public, and only secondarily to reward
the copyright holder.4"
The origins of Canadian copyright law are markedly different.
Canada's Constitution Act of 1867 grants Parliament the power to
35. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, in
Copyfights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age 125, 128
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) [hereinafter Copyfights].
36. L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of
User's Rights 49-50 (1991).
37. See id. at 70.
38. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
40. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
41. Id. at 429.
42. Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 36, at 70-71.
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legislate copyright, but, unlike the United States Constitution, is silent
on the theories underlying its decision to do so. 3 The traditional
Canadian justification for copyright was the natural right of the author
to the products of her labor." Natural rights theory is based on the
Lockean notion that an author has an inherent property right in her
own creative work. 5 Until very recently, this theory dominated
discourse about copyright in Canada.46 A 1934 case in the Canadian
Court of Chancery, for example, noted that the Copyright Act "was
passed with a single object, namely, the benefit of authors. '47 Even
more bluntly, a 1985 Sub-Committee Report on Copyright stated,
"'[o]wnership is ownership is ownership.' The copyright owner owns
the intellectual works in the same sense that a landowner owns
land.
48
Another theory that finds recognition in the Canadian Copyright
Act is that of moral rights.49 The notion of moral rights is founded on
the Hegelian notion that an author invests her personality in her
creative work." As such, that work deserves protection from actions
that modify it so as "to prejudice the honour or reputation of the
author."51  Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the
limited nature of these rights, specifically their inability to protect
against actions that, although taken without the author's consent, do
not strictly damage the author's honor or reputation.52
43. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91, cl. 23 (U.K.), reprinted in
R.S.C., app. II, no. 5 (1985).
44. David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the
Limits of Copyright in Canada, 55 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 175, 191 (1997).
45. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in
Copyfights, supra note 35, at 1, 3.
46. See Fewer, supra note 44, at 191.
47. Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Hammond's Bradford Brewery Co., [1934] 1
Ch. 121,127 (Can.).
48. Standing Comm. on Communications and Culture, Report of the Sub-Comm.
on the Revision of Copyright, A Charter of Rights for Creators, Standing Committee
on Communications and Culture 9 (1985) (Ministry of Supply and Services Canada).
49. The Canadian Copyright Act grants authors moral rights in their work.
Authors may not assign these rights, but they may bequeath them to a specified
person after their death. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 10 (4th Supp.), §§ 4, 6 (1985)
(Can.).
50. Under this theory, an author expresses her will to personhood by claiming
externalities as individual property. Moral rights therefore protect the author's
identity in her work. As such, they last even after a particular work has been sold.
Rebekah O'Hara, You Say You Want a Revolution: Music & Technology- Evolution
or Destruction?, 39 Gonz. L. Rev. 247, 253 (2003).
51. R.S.C., ch. 10 (4th Supp.), § 6.
52. See Thdberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336,
355 (Can.). In Th~berge, the court dealt a sweeping blow to moral rights, stating that
"[o]nce an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally
for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it." Id. at 355-56.
This holding severely limited the protections of moral rights. Viewed expansively,
moral rights protect against any modification of a work contrary to the author's
consent. As the court noted in Th~berge, however, the Canadian Copyright Act
2328 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
Because Canada's justifications for copyright focused almost
exclusively on the rights of authors, the Canadian copyright regime
was traditionally less protective of users' rights than its American
counterpart. In Canada, for example, more subject matter qualified
for copyright than in the United States. Blank forms, such as
accounting forms and sporting schedules, are copyrightable in
Canada,53 but not in the United States. 4 Similarly, Canada allows the
government to copyright works produced by any governmental
department,55  while the United States denies protection to
government works. 6
Perhaps most striking is the difference between the Canadian
defense to copyright infringement, called fair dealing, and the
comparable American defense of fair use. The Canadian Copyright
Act explicitly delimits the fair dealing defense to research or private
58study, 7 criticism or review, and news reporting.5" Additionally, the
fair dealing defense is only available for the purposes of criticism or
review and news reporting if the person asserting the defense can
show that he acknowledged the source of the copyrighted material."
The American defense of fair use is much more expansive. The
American Copyright Act includes a list of purposes that may satisfy
the criteria for fair use, but this list is clearly not exhaustive.61 Instead,
whether a particular use is fair depends on (1) the purpose and
specifically limits protection to acts that prejudice the author's honor- apparently a
high standard to prove. See id. at 349, 353.
53. See U&R Tax Services Ltd. v. H&R Block Canada Inc., [1995] 62 C.P.R. (3d)
257 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.) (copyright subsists in a compilation where sufficient time and
labor has been expended); Bulman Group Ltd. v. "One Write" Accounting Sys. Ltd.,
[19821 2 F.C. 327 (Trial Div.) (Can.) (accounting forms copyrightable); B.C. Jockey
Club v. Standen, [1985] 8 C.P.R. (3d) 283 (B.C. Ct. App.) (Can.) (horse racing
schedules copyrightable).
54. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2004) (stating that blank forms and sporting schedules are
not copyrightable); see also Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(rejecting outlay of time and labor as sufficient for copyrightability); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879) (stating that blank accounting forms are not copyrightable).
55. R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 12.
56. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). The government may, however, hold
copyrights that outside parties assign, bequeath, or otherwise transfer to it. Id.
57. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 24, § 18 (1997) (Can.).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The Copyright Act mentions purposes "such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research" as examples of fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The use of the words "such as"
indicates that the list is non-exhaustive. Id. The Supreme Court has also endorsed an
expansive view of fair use, stating that the task of determining whether a particular
use is fair "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. The text employs the terms
'including' and 'such as' . . . to indicate the 'illustrative and not limitative' function of
the examples given." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)
(citations omitted).
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character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 62 Fair use in
the United States potentially applies to any situation, not merely to
the presumptively worthy purposes outlined in the Canadian
Copyright Act.63 As a result, many uses, such as parody, that may
constitute fair use in the United States may nevertheless infringe on
copyright in Canada.'
2. Recent Shifts in Canadian Copyright
Recently, however, Canadian courts have become increasingly
sympathetic to utilitarian justifications for copyright. In Th~berge v.
Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc.,65 the Supreme Court of Canada
acknowledged that the Copyright Act must strike a balance "between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination
of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the
creator. ' 66 As weighed against the public interest, creators' rights
must be limited in nature.67
The court went on to state that "[e]xcessive control by holders of
copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit
the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative
innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole., 68
Accordingly, in a sweeping blow to moral rights theory, the court
declared that once an authorized copy of a work is sold to the public,
the purchaser-not the author-generally has the right to determine
what happens to it.69 Th~berge thus represented a dramatic departure
from the natural rights and moral rights principles that had long
informed Canadian copyright law.
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Canada heard another
copyright case, CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,"
in which a group of copyright holders challenged the operating society
of Canada's Great Library.7 The library provided request-based
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
63. See supra note 61.
64. David Vaver, Canada's Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative
Overview, 17 Intell. Prop. J. 125, 151 (2004). Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572
(holding that parody of a song, even if for a commercial purpose, may be a fair use),
with Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada, [1997] 2 F.C. 306 (Trial Div.) (Can.) (holding
that parody is not "criticism" within the fair dealing defense).
65. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Sup. Ct.) (Can.).
66. Id. at 355.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 356.
69. Id. at 355-56.
70. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Sup. Ct.) (Can.).
71. Id. at 346.
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photocopy services and self-service photocopiers, both of which the
plaintiffs argued were used to infringe on their copyrights. 72 In a
dramatic decision signifying its fidelity to the utilitarian notion of
copyright balance, the court held that the Law Society did not infringe
on CCH's copyrights when it reproduced various works in its library.73
The court illustrated this new fidelity in its discussion of both the
originality requirement for copyrightability, 74 and the fair dealing
defense. 5  On the issue of originality, the court noted that,
historically, Canadian courts had adopted a low standard of
originality, granting copyright protection to any work which involved
a certain degree of time and labor to produce.76  This
"industriousness" standard of originality comports with a natural
rights view of copyright.77 In CCH Canadian, however, the court held
that such a standard would "tip the scale [of copyright] in favour of
the author's or creator's rights, at the loss of society's interest in
maintaining a robust public domain that could help foster future
creative innovation., 78  Instead, the court adopted a standard of
originality that requires for copyrightability that a work be the
product of the exercise of skill and judgment.79
The court also dramatically broadened the scope of Canada's fair
dealing defense. Characterizing fair dealing as a "user's right" and
counterweight to copyright, the court stated that fair dealing is "an
integral part of the Copyright Act [rather] than simply a defence."8
To maintain the proper balance between copyrights and users' rights,
courts must therefore give fair dealing a "large and liberal"
interpretation.81 For example, the court interpreted the fair dealing
exception to exempt research for commercial purposes, as well as for
charity and private study.82
Most significantly, the court consolidated the several defenses to
copyright infringement into what Professor Michael Geist has called a
72. Id.
73. Id. at 348.
74. Id. at 351-60.
75. Id. at 364-75.
76. Id. at 354. While pointing out the historical approach of Canadian courts, the
CCH Canadian court also recognized that, in recent years, a few courts had moved
away from the industriousness standard. Id. (citing Edutile Inc. v. Auto. Prot. Ass'n,
[2000] 4 F.C. 195 (Ct. App.) (Can.); Tele-Direct (Publ'ns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info. Inc.,
[1998] 2 F.C. 22 (Ct. App.) (Can.)).
77. Id. at 351-52.
78. Id. at 355.
79. Id. at 357.
80. Id. at 364.
81. Id. at 365.
82. Id. The court noted, however, that research conducted for commercial
purposes may not be "as fair" as research conducted for more laudable purposes, such
as charity. Id. at 367.
[Vol. 732330
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"new copyright" right: users' rights.83 This notion of users' rights,
never before explicit in Canadian jurisprudence, emerged out of CCH
Canadian as a limiting principle on the rights of copyright holders.84
As a result of this unrelenting focus, Geist has hailed the unanimous
decision "as one of the strongest pro-user rights decisions from any
high court in the world, showing what it means to do more than pay
mere lip service to balance in copyright."85
Considering that Canada has historically been more protective of
the rights of copyright holders, the supreme court's pronouncement in
CCH Canadian was quite remarkable. Indeed, and perhaps even
more remarkably, many of the principles of CCH Canadian are
responsible for the federal court's holding in BMG Canada86-the
case that pronounced file sharing legal under the Canadian Copyright
Act.
B. Copyright and Technological Innovation
The advent of file-sharing technology is not the first time that the
copyright regime has had to deal with challenges from new
technologies. Many of the greatest innovations of the past century
began with copyright infringement,87 or introduced an enhanced
capacity for users to infringe on copyrighted materials.88 In each case,
either the legislature89 or the judiciary9" stepped in to resolve the
conflict. The result was the adaptation of the copyright regime to
83. Michael Geist, Low-Tech Case Has High-Tech Impact, Toronto Star Online,
Mar. 22, 2004, at
http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Articl
e_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=1079910611083.
84. CCH Canadian, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 364-65.
85. Geist, supra note 83. Geist also argues that CCH Canadian represents a
"growing personalization of copyright" within Canada.
Accompanying the Canadian Supreme Court's increased focus on the rights
of users is the view that copyright is no longer primarily about large-scale
commercial infringement claims that do not resonate with the average
person. Rather, copyright is now very personal, focusing on the work,
creativity, and activities of millions of individuals-including judges-who
will increasingly question standards of what is right and wrong through the
lens of their own actions.
Id.
86. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241, 260 (Trial Div.) (Can.);
see infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
87. Radio and cable television are examples of technologies that were born of
piracy. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
88. The VCR allowed users to record copyrighted television programs, thereby
infringing on copyright. See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
89. In the case of radio and cable television, Congress set a low statutory licensing
fee for the use of copyrighted materials. See infra notes 92-96, 100 and accompanying
text.
90. In the case of the VCR, the U.S. Supreme Court created a rule of contributory
infringement that protected the VCR from liability. See infra notes 103-12 and
accompanying text.
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ensure both adequate compensation for creators, and freedom for the
development of new technologies.
1. Past Innovations and Infringement
When the radio emerged as a popular medium, it did so by
essentially infringing on the public performance rights of both
composers and recording artists.91  Composers demanded
compensation for the use of their songs, and Congress responded by
setting a low statutory licensing fee.92 As a result, radio continued to
flourish, and composers now earn approximately $300 million a year
from American radio stations. 93 Recording artists, on the other hand,
do not receive any compensation under existing copyright law.94
When they argued in front of Congress that radio was not respecting
their intellectual property rights, Congress rejected their claim,95
concluding that the indirect benefit of increased public exposure was
sufficient compensation.96
The birth of cable television is another example of a technology that
spanned copyright infringement, and which copyright owners
vehemently opposed. At their inception, most cable companies
refused to compensate broadcasters for the content that they echoed.97
Even more egregiously, when the cable companies started demanding
subscriptions from their customers, they refused to pay for the
television broadcasts they sold.9 Broadcasters and copyright owners
attacked this practice as theft, and fought the cable companies for
nearly thirty years.99 Eventually, however, Congress resolved the
issue by requiring cable companies to pay a statutory license fee for
the content that they broadcast. 00
The advent of P2P is also not the first time that the reaction of
copyright holders to new methods of infringement has been to attack
the technology directly. Perhaps the most famous battle between
copyright and technology occurred with the introduction of the
VCR.10 The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the conflict in Sony
91. Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the
Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity 58 (2004).
92. See id. at 74; William Fisher, Don't Beat Them, Join Them, N.Y. Times, June
25, 2004, at A23.
93. Fisher, supra note 92. This figure, from 2000, represented roughly three
percent of radio stations' total revenues for that year. Id.
94. Lessig, supra note 91, at 59.
95. Id. at 74.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 59.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 60-61.
100. Id. at 61.
101. Copyright holders reacted vociferously to the VCR. Jack Valenti, then and
still the President of the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"),
famously stated that the VCR was "to the American film producer and the American
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Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.'10 2 and held that Sony
was not contributorily liable for any copyright infringement that VCR
users committed.0 3 Drawing on patent law principles, the Court
noted the importance of the public interest in access to articles of
commerce like the VCR." Accordingly, the mere sale of such a
product would not constitute contributory infringement if the product
was "widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes." 105
Indeed, the Court went on to say that the product "need merely be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.1 0 6
The Court then phrased the relevant question as whether the VCR
was "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." 107 The
Court deliberately did not address the question of how much use is
commercially significant, because one use of the VCR plainly satisfied
the Court's standard." 8 This use was "time-shifting,"'0 9 the practice of
recording a television program playing at an inconvenient time for
later viewing at a more convenient time."0 The Court agreed with the
district court's finding that consumers principally used the VCR for
time-shifting purposes."' Because time shifting constituted fair use, it
was a noninfringing use of the VCR, and Sony escaped liability.' 2
Since then, the Sony case has served as an important precedent for the
determination of contributory liability for technological innovations.' 3
public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman alone." Adam Liptak, Is Litigation the
Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2000, at B9 (quoting Jack
Valenti), available at
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/09/biztech/articles/02napster.html.
102. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
103. Id. at 443-56.
104. Id. at 440.
105. Id. at 442.
106. Id. The four dissenters disagreed with this standard, arguing that the correct
inquiry should be whether "a significant portion of the product's use is noninfringing."
Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, if virtually all of the product's use was
infringing, or if no one would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, then
the manufacturer would be "purposely profiting" from the infringement, and should
be contributorily liable. Id. The dissent also reasoned that the key factual question
should be the amount of VCR usage that was infringing, not the amount of television
programming that was copyrighted. Id. at 492. Because the district court declined to
make findings on the percentage of legal use versus illegal use, the dissent would have
remanded the case for further factual consideration. Id. at 492-93.
107. Id. at 442.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 421.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 443-56.
113. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding the manufacturer of the "Game Genie," a technology that allowed
users to alter features of copyrighted video games, not liable for contributory
infringement); Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding liable for contributory infringement manufacturers of software
used to pirate cable transmissions intended for paying customers); A&M Records,
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2. Private Copying
Yet the innovation with perhaps the most dramatic effect on
copyright law was the cassette recorder, which, in the 1980s and 1990s,
ushered in an era of at-home recording of music played on the radio,
and an accompanying controversy among private users and copyright
holders.
114
a. The Canadian Private Copying Exception
In 1997, Canadian authorities realized the futility of trying to
prevent citizens from copying songs for private use.'15 Consequently,
Parliament added sections to the Canadian Copyright Act which
legalized private copying.116  The private copying exemption
specifically allowed for the copying of musical works onto audio
recording media for the private use of the person making the copy.
117
The Copyright Act defines audio recording media as any media "onto
Inc. v. Gen. Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
seller of blank, time-loaded cassettes liable for contributory infringement).
114. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
115. See Mark K.J. Rushton & Virginia H.L. Jones, The Tortoise and the Hare:
Canadian Legislative Copyright Reforms Race Against Copyright Infringement over
Kazaa and Other New Generation Peer-to-Peer Networks, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 197 (2004).
Rushton and Jones note that Canadian legislators were guided by the words of British
judge Lord Templeman in CBS Songs Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics, [1988] 2
All E.R. 484 (H.L.) (Eng.). Rushton & Jones, supra, at 244. Regarding private
copying, Lord Templeman stated the following:
From the point of view of society the present position is lamentable.
Millions of breaches of the law must be committed by home copiers every
year. Some home copiers may break the law in ignorance, despite extensive
publicity and warning notices on records, tapes and films. Some home
copiers may break the law because they estimate that the chances of
detection are non-existent. Some home copiers may consider that the
entertainment and recording industry already exhibit all the characteristics
of an undesirable monopoly, lavish expenses, extravagant earnings and
exorbitant profits, and that the blank tape is the only restraint on further
increases in the prices of records. Whatever the reason for home copying,
the beat of Sergeant Pepper and the soaring sounds of the Miserere from
unlawful copies are more powerful than law-abiding instincts or twinges of
conscience. A law which is treated with such contempt should be amended
or repealed.
[1988] 2 All E.R. at 498. Many of these comments apply to the current P2P situation
as well. In particular, many P2P users are forthright about the illegality of their
activity, but claim that they are fighting against the tyrannical monopoly of "Big
Music." See, e.g., Neil Strauss, A Chance to Break the Pop Stranglehold, N.Y. Times,
May 9, 1999, § 2 (Magazine), at 1; David Wiernicki, Big Music Doesn't Deserve Your
Money, 14850 Magazine, Feb. 2004, at
http://magazine.14850.com/0402/musicindustry.html; Boycott-riaa.com, Why We Are
Here, at http://www.boycott-riaa.com/mission (last visited Feb. 12, 2005); Ram
Samudrala, The Free Music Philosophy (vl.4) (June 17, 1998), at
http://www.ram.org/ramblings/philosophy/fmp.html.
116. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 24, § 50 (1997) (Can.).
117. Id.
2005] A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES 2335
which a sound recording may be reproduced, and that is of a kind
ordinarily used by individual consumers for that purpose." ' 8 To
compensate artists for lost royalties due to private copying, the Act
requires all manufacturers and importers of blank audio recording
media sold in Canada to pay a levy." 9
The Canadian Copyright Board is responsible for setting the levy
rate. '2 Currently, the rates stand at 29g for audio cassettes of forty
minutes or more; 21g for CD-Rs12' and CD-RWs; 122 77¢ for CD-R
Audios, 123 CD-RW Audios,'124 and MiniDiscs; 125 $2 for non-removable
memory recorders of no more than 1GB 126 of data; $15 for recorders
between 1GB and no more than 10GB; and $25 for recorders of over
10GB, such as the popular Apple iPod.127 The money from this levy
then goes to collecting societies 28 for the benefit of eligible authors,'
29
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. CD-R stands for "compact disc-recordable," a type of compact disc onto
which a user can copy files. Once those files are copied onto a CD-R, however, the
user cannot erase or replace them. Microsoft, Windows Media Knowledge Center
Glossary, at
http://www.microsoft.comlwindows/windowsmedia/knowledgecenter/glossary.aspx#co
mpact-discrecordable cd-r..gls (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). A compact disc is a
storage medium for digital data. Id.
122. CD-RW stands for "compact disc-rewritable," a type of compact disc onto
which a user can copy, erase, and replace files. Id.
123. A CD-R Audio is a high density compact disc used to store digitally sampled
audio. Sony DADC, Glossary, at http://www.sonydadc.com/customerarea.glossary.go
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005). Once a user has copied music files onto a CD-R Audio,
they cannot be erased or replaced. See supra note 121.
124. A CD-RW Audio, like a CD-R Audio, is a high density compact disc used to
store digitally sampled audio. Sony DADC, supra note 123. Unlike a CD-R Audio,
however, a user can copy, erase, and replace music files on a CD-RW Audio. See
supra note 122.
125. A Minidisc is a compact data storage medium designed to store music.
Yamaha, MD4 Glossary, at
http://www.yamaha.co.jp/product/proaudio/homeenglish/faq/glossaries/glossarie/md4-
glossary.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
126. A byte is a unit of data that typically holds a single character, such as a letter,
digit, or punctuation mark. Microsoft, Microsoft Glossary for Business Users, at
http://www.microsoft.com/atwork/glossary.mspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). A gigabyte
("GB") is equivalent to approximately one billion bytes. Id.
127. Private Copying 2003-2004 Decision, [2003] 28 C.P.R. (4th) 417, available at
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf.
128. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 24, § 50 (1997) (Can.). An independent
organization called the Canadian Private Copying Collective collects the levies and
then routes them through collecting societies for distribution to eligible parties.
Canadian Private Copying Collective, Royalty Distribution-Information for
Copyright Holders, at http://cpcc.ca/english/infoCopyHolders.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2005) [hereinafter CPCC Royalty Information].
129. An author of a musical work that is embodied in a sound recording is eligible,
regardless of when the work was written or recorded, if copyright subsists in Canada
in that musical work. See R.S.C., ch. 24, § 50.
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makers, 3 ° and performers.1 3 1 Copyright holders register with these
collective societies, and receive royalties based on representative
samples of radio airplay and album sales.1 32 From 2000 to 2003, the
Canadian Private Copying Collective ("CPCC") 13 3 collected more
than CA $78 million.' In 2003 and 2004, over CA $35 million was
actually distributed to eligible parties.'35
The Canadian government intended these levies to compensate
creators only for royalties lost due to private copying. To compensate
creators for infringement occurring over the Internet, the Society of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada ("SOCAN")
proposed an additional tariff in 1995.136 This tariff, known as Tariff 22,
would make internet service providers ("ISPs") responsible for paying
royalties for all copies their users made while using their Internet
services. 13 Although no one contested the validity or necessity of the
tariff, the ISPs argued that they should not be responsible for the
infringing actions of their users.' After nine years of litigation, the
Supreme Court of Canada agreed. In SOCAN v. Canadian Ass'n of
Internet Providers, the court held that ISPs are not content providers,
but rather intermediaries. 139 As such, absent special circumstances,
ISPs are not liable for infringement occurring on their networks. 40
Nevertheless, Canada's blank media levy remains in place.
130. A maker of a sound recording (for example, a recording company) that
embodies a musical work is eligible, regardless of when the work was recorded, if the
maker, at the time the work was first fixed into a sound recording, had its
headquarters in Canada or, if the maker is a natural person and not a corporation,
was a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada, and copyright subsists in
Canada in the sound recording. A maker is also eligible if, at the time the work was
first fixed into a sound recording, the maker had its headquarters in a country
published under Section 50 of the Copyright Act or, if the maker is a natural person,
was a citizen, subject, or permanent resident of that country. Id.
131. A performer of a musical work, regardless of when the performance took
place, is eligible if the performance is embodied in a sound recording and the
performer was, at the date the performance was first fixed into a sound recording, a
Canadian citizen or permanent resident, and copyright subsists in the recording in
Canada. A performer is also eligible if, at the date the performance was first fixed
into a sound recording, the performer was a citizen, subject, or permanent resident of
a country published under Section 50 of the Copyright Act. See id.
132. CPCC Royalty Information, supra note 128. The allocation of funds for the
year 2000 was: 75% to eligible authors, 13.7% to eligible performers, and 11.3% to
eligible makers. Id. The allocation of funds for 2001 to 2004 was: 66% to eligible
authors, 18.9% to eligible performers, and 15.1% to eligible makers. Id.
133. The CPCC is an independent organization which the Copyright Board has
designated to collect private copying levies. See supra note 128.
134. See Canadian Private Copying Collective, Financial Highlights, at
http://cpcc.ca/english/finHighlights.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
135. Id.
136. Rushton & Jones, supra note 115, at 251.
137. Id. at 252.
138. Id.
139. [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427
140. See id. Unlike Canada, the United States has enacted legislation exempting
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b. The American Audio Home Recording Act
Canada is not the only country to have implemented a blank media
levy to compensate creators for private copying. At least twenty-five
countries, including the United States, have comparable regimes.
141
The comparable statute in the United States is the Audio Home
Recording Act ("AHRA"). 142  The AHRA requires manufacturers
and importers of digital audio recording devices to pay a levy of two
percent of the transfer price,14' and manufacturers and importers of
blank media to pay three percent of the transfer price. an  The
Canadian private copying exception, on the other hand, only requires
payment from the manufacturers and importers of blank media. 45
The reach of the AHRA's exemption for private copying also
differs slightly from its Canadian counterpart. The AHRA is broader
in that it exempts individuals from liability for copyright infringement
for any noncommercial copying use of a digital audio recording device
or medium.'46 The Canadian version, however, only exempts the
ISPs for liability for infringing material on their networks under certain
circumstances. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-
304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)). The DMCA
has proven to be extremely controversial. For a sampling of the issues in this
controversy, see Matthew Amedeo, Shifting the Burden: The Unconstitutionality of
Section 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Its Impact on Internet
Service Providers, 11 CommLaw Conspectus 311 (2003); David Nimmer, Back from
the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 16 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 855 (2001); Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., An Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise:
Did Congress Overstep Its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the Circumvention
Prevention Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act?, 41 Brandeis L.J. 33
(2002); Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use,
40 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 (2002).
141. Rushton & Jones, supra note 115, at 247 n.184.
142. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000). The portions of the Audio Home Recording
Act ("AHRA") which delineate the use of blank media levies are located at §§ 1003-
1007.
143. Id. § 1004(a)(1). In the case of a domestic product, the "transfer price" of a
digital audio recording device or medium is the manufacturer's transfer price. Id. §
1001(12). In the case of an imported product, the "transfer price" is the actual
entered value at United States Customs. Id.
144. Id. § 1004(b). For a definition of "transfer price," see supra note 143. The
Register of Copyrights receives the royalties culled from these levies, and deposits
them into the Treasury of the United States for later distribution to eligible parties. 17
U.S.C. § 1005. Two-thirds of the royalties then go to the Sound Recording Fund,
which allocates forty percent for featured artists, a small percentage for non-featured
artists and back-up musicians, and the rest for record companies. Id. § 1006(b)(1).
The remaining one-third of the royalties go into a Musical Works Fund, which
allocates fifty percent for songwriters and fifty percent for music publishers. Id. §
1006(b)(2). Interested parties must file a claim with the Librarian of Congress to
receive royalties. Id. § 1007(a)(1).
145. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 24, § 50 (1997) (Can.).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
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making of private copies for one purpose: the personal use of the
individual making the copy.147
Conversely, the AHRA is narrower than its Canadian counterpart
in that it only exempts recordings made using devices or media which
are "primarily marketed" or "most commonly used" for digital audio
recording.'48 The Canadian version, on the other hand, exempts
media "ordinarily used" for recording, whether or not recording is
their primary use. 149 It is for this reason that the AHRA has seen
much less use than its Canadian counterpart: technologies that the
statute did not cover quickly superseded the digital audio recording
devices that the AHRA explicitly referenced. 5 °
Exempting private copying from infringement liability made sense
during the greater part of the 1990s, when taping a small selection of
songs onto blank cassette tapes was a common and-despite the
recording industry's frequent warnings to the contrary-relatively
innocuous practice.15' A few years later, however, a new technological
innovation would challenge the existing copyright regime in a way and
on a scale that no one anticipated.
3. P2P Technology Arrives
That innovation is P2P file sharing, a term which refers to the
instantaneous online exchange of files between computer users. 152
Typically, these files are MP3 files containing copyrighted songs.
1 53
The compression of songs into small, easily transferable MP3 files,
together with the advent of file-sharing technologies, revolutionized
147. R.S.C., ch. 24, § 50 (1997).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)-(4).
149. R.S.C., ch. 24, § 50 (1997).
150. See Mark A. Lernley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345, 1407 (2004).
151. See generally Mark Jenkins, Hit Charade, Slate, Aug. 20, 2002, at
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2069732. Nevertheless, home taping did ignite a huge
controversy in the 1980s and 1990s. For a sampling of the issues surrounding this
controversy, see N. Jansen Calamita, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox:
Keeping the Sound Recording Copyright Viable in the Digital Age, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 505
(1994); Jonathan Fein, Note, Home Taping of Sound Recordings: Infringement or
Fair Use?, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 647 (1983); and Michael Plumleigh, Comment, Digital
Audio Tape: New Fuel Stokes the Smoldering Home Taping Fire, 37 UCLA L. Rev.
733 (1990).
152. Aric Jacover, Note, I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme
to Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 Geo. L.J.
2207, 2213 (2002).
153. MP3 files are digital audio files that utilize what is known as a Layer 3 coding
scheme. This coding scheme greatly condenses the audio file, without any noticeable
sacrifice in sound quality. Because MP3 files are small, they are easy to transfer
across the Internet. Alex Colangelo, Copyright Infringement in the Internet Era: The
Challenge of MP3s, 39 Alberta L. Rev. 891, 894 (2002).
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the distribution of digital data.154 The effects were immediate. When
file-sharing network Napster debuted on the Internet in May 1999,155
it quickly became the fastest growing Internet site in history.'56 By the
end of its first year, Napster had twenty-three million subscribers.'57
By 2001, when the recording industry finally succeeded in shutting
Napster down,' over eighty million users had downloaded as many as
three billion songs a month. 59
Part of the success of the P2P model lies in how incredibly easy it is
to use. To begin file sharing, a computer user must download file-
sharing software from any one of various, easily accessible sites on the
Internet.' 6° Once the user installs the software on her computer, she
can download songs from other connected users simply by searching
the P2P network for a particular file and then clicking on that file.'6
The user can also allow others to download songs from her computer
by uploading her collection of music onto a shared folder.162 Other
users can then search the shared folder and download whatever files
they like. 63
There are essentially two types of P2P networks: centralized
servers like Napster, and decentralized servers like Aimster, Grokster,
and Kazaa. Centralized servers like Napster operate by storing an
index of available files on a central database."6 Although the central
server maintains a list of file names, the actual files remain on the
users' computers. 165 When a user requests a specific file, the request
goes through the central server, which searches through the list until it
154. See Aaron M. Bailey, Comment, A Nation of Felons?: Napster, the Net Act,
and the Criminal Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 473, 479 (2000).
155. Damon Lussier, Beyond Napster: Online Music Distribution and the Future of
Copyright, 10 U. Bait. Intell. Prop. L.J. 25, 28 (2001).
156. Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 473, 474 (2002).
157. Id.
158. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
159. Timothy James Ryan, Infringement.com: RIAA v. Napster and the War
Against Online Music Piracy, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 495, 520 (2002).
160. All of the most popular P2P networks, including Kazaa, Morpheus, eDonkey,
and Limewire, offer their file-sharing software free of charge.
161. See generally Amedeo, supra note 140, at 311-12; David Balaban, The Battle of
the Music Industry: The Distribution of Audio and Video Works via the Internet,
Music and More, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 235, 243-45 (2001);
Wikipedia, File Sharing, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File-sharing (last visited Feb.
12, 2005).
162. See generally Kevin Michael Lemley, Protecting Consumers from Themselves:
Alleviating the Market Inequalities Created by Online Copyright Infringement in the
Entertainment Industry, 13 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 613, 623 (2003).
163. See id. Because uploading users essentially make copyrighted works available
for everyone else to download, the recording industry has targeted uploaders in its
infringement lawsuits. See Katie Dean, RIAA Legal Landslide Begins, Wired News,
Sept. 8, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60345,00.html.
164. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
165. Id.
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finds a match.166 The server then communicates the host user's
address to the requesting user, and the requesting user's computer
establishes a connection with the host computer through which the
user downloads the file.167 Thus, while the actual file transfer is peer-
to-peer, the system accomplishes that transfer through centralized
searching.
In contrast, decentralized networks, as their name suggests, do not
maintain a central server. 6 8  Rather, these networks use either
decentralized indexing systems, under which each user's computer
maintains a list of files available on that computer only; or
"supernode" systems, under which a select number of users'
computers act as indexing servers.169 Another important feature of
decentralized networks is their use of encryption technology.
170
Encryption conceals the name and contents of the files being shared
as well as the identity of the sharing users. 7' Thus, it allows P2P
transactions to occur without the network knowing what files are
being traded or by whom. 172
P2P technology is clearly among the greatest challenges facing
copyright law today, and has proven to be a true hydra for the
entertainment industry. Indeed, no sooner had Napster disappeared
than a whole new crop of P2P networks sprung up to take its place.'73
Currently, there are many dozens of file-sharing services in operation,
each of which boasts several thousand to several million users.'74
In its fight against the growing threat of P2P, the recording industry
has sought relief from both individual file sharers'75 and the file-
sharing networks themselves. 76 That individual P2P users are liable
for exchanging copyrighted files has not been seriously contested since
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-
59 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
169. Id.
170. See Hisanari Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems
Current and Future Issues on Secondary Liability Under Copyright Laws in the United
States and Japan, 22 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 37, 60 (2001).
171. See generally Jack Germain, Encrypted File Sharing: P2P Fights Back,
TechNewsWorld, May 27, 2004, at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/34052.html.
172. See Tanaka, supra note 170, at 61 (noting the difficulty in detecting copyright
infringement and enforcing copyright law because of the encryption of decentralized
P2P networks).
173. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 731, 770 (2003).
174. Indeed, over 200 million users have downloaded file-sharing software. Jon M.
Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy
and Ethics, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1278, 1280 (2003); see also Thomas Mennecke,
eDonkey/Overnet Rapidly Approaching FastTrack, Slyck.com, May 13, 2004, at
http://www.slyck.com/news.php?story=477.
175. See supra note 14.
176. See infra notes 248-74 and accompanying text.
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.177 that file sharing was an illegal
activity.'78 Whether P2P networks are contributorily liable for
infringement occurring on their systems is a much murkier issue. The
Ninth Circuit held in Napster that centralized servers were
contributory infringers,"7 9 but came to the opposite conclusion about
decentralized networks in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster Ltd.8' Prior to the Ninth Circuit's disposition in Grokster,
the Seventh Circuit had ruled that even decentralized networks were
subject to liability for contributory infringement. 8 1 To resolve these
issues, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grokster on
December 10, 2004.182
Much of the confusion surrounding liability in this context stems
from P2P's radically enhanced capacity for mass-scale copyright
infringement. The innovations of P2P challenge traditional notions of
copyright, as well as traditional enforcement mechanisms. The
existing regimes of the United States and Canada are in jeopardy, and
new ones are emerging to take their place.
II. P2P AND THE EMERGING COPYRIGHT REGIMES IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
The introduction of P2P has undoubtedly produced fundamental
shifts in American and Canadian copyright consciousness. In the
United States, copyright has become increasingly focused on
enforcing existing laws and protecting existing methods of the
distribution of creative works. In many cases, this approach involves
an expansion of the rights and remedies of copyright holders.183 In
Canada, however, copyright has become increasingly flexible, and
increasingly focused on the rights of users.1" There are three central
considerations that form the response of each country to the P2P
177. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. The Napster court rejected all of Napster's arguments regarding the legality of
file-sharing activity. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
179. 239 F.3d at 1019-22.
180. 380 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
181. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
182. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
183. See infra notes 305-49 and accompanying text. The recording industry (the
RIAA in the United States and CRIA in Canada) is both the plaintiff in all of the
below-mentioned P2P cases, and the lobbying force behind the legislation currently
before Congress and the Canadian Parliament. This is unsurprising, given that it is
the recording industry's interests that are primarily at stake in the P2P wars. Artists,
whose interests are also at stake, do not always approve of the RIAA's actions,
however. See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in the Middle,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2003, § 1 (Magazine), at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/14/technology/14MUSI.html.
184. See infra notes 202-44 and accompanying text.
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crisis, which this Note addresses in turn. Specifically, Part II.A
discusses the legality of file sharing as an activity, Part II.B addresses
the liability of file-sharing networks for infringement occurring on
their systems, and Part II.C examines proposed responses to the P2P
crisis.
A. The Legality of File Sharing
On both centralized and decentralized P2P networks, the capacity
for large-scale copyright infringement is indisputable. Moreover, in
the United States at least, there is no doubt that sharing copyrighted
musical works over P2P networks is illegal. The Ninth Circuit in
Napster, the first case to address liability for P2P networks, effectively
ruled on the illegality of file sharing by rejecting all of Napster's
affirmative defenses on the issue.185
Regarding fair use, the Napster court found that all of the factors in
the fair use analysis 186 established that file sharing was not entitled to
protection. 87 First, the purpose of the use was non-transformative
and commercial, because users were getting for free something which
they would ordinarily have to buy.'88 Second, the nature of the
copyrighted songs was creative and thus deserved a high degree of
protection. 89 Third, users typically downloaded entire songs, rather
than short samples. 9 ° Finally, file sharing had a harmful effect on the
market for the copyrighted works because it both reduced audio CD
sales and made it more difficult for copyright holders to create
legitimate digital markets for their works. 1 '
Additionally, the court rejected Napster's claims that using P2P
networks to "sample" music before purchasing a CD was fair use. 192
Regardless of whether users eventually purchased the CD, the court
noted that the copying of entire songs remained a commercial use. 193
Even if Napster could have shown that sampling increased audio CD
sales, that fact should not deprive the copyright holder of the right to
license the material. 194
185. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-20, 1024-27 (9th Cir.
2001).
186. The four factors in the fair use analysis are: (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2000).
187. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-19.
188. Id. at 1015.
189. Id. at 1016.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1016-17.
192. Id. at 1018.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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Furthermore, copyright holders generally regulated, and were
entitled to regulate, the market for promotional downloads.195
Allowing users to sample music on P2P networks would usurp the
rights of copyright holders to develop digital markets for their
works.'9 6 Likewise, the practice of "space-shifting," or downloading a
song that a user already owned on a CD to a computer hard drive, was
not fair use, because once a user listed a song on his computer, it
became available for distribution to the general public.'97
Notably, the court also held that the AHRA did not exempt file
sharers from liability for copyright infringement.'98 A computer hard
drive was not an "audio recording medium" within the AHRA's plain
meaning, because it was not primarily marketed or most commonly
used for recording. 199 The court also cited a Senate Report for the
conclusion that a "digital music recording" under the AHRA does not
include songs fixed onto computer hard drives.2" The Napster court's
adjudication of these affirmative defenses established liability for file
sharing so clearly that, in the two major cases involving P2P networks
following the Napster decision, the defendants did not even raise the
defenses of fair use or exemption under the AHRA.2 °'
In Canada, however, the legality of file sharing is slightly murkier.
In December 2003, the Copyright Board of Canada issued an opinion
stating that downloading music from P2P networks2° fell within
Canada's private copying exception.2 °3 Specifically, the Board noted
that the private copying exception only addresses end copies; it does
not consider the source of the copied material.2°4 Thus, there is no
requirement that the source be a noninfringing copy, and, as a result,
no liability ensues for copying pirated songs from P2P networks.2 °5
A few months later, in March 2004, the federal court decided in
BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe that neither downloading nor
uploading copyrighted musical works onto a P2P network constitutes
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1019.
198. Id. at 1024-25. For a discussion of the AHRA and its provisions, see supra
notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
199. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
200. Id. at 1024-25 (citing S. Rep. No. 102-294 (1992)).
201. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540
U.S. 1107 (2004).
202. The Board found that private copying from the Internet constituted just under
half of all private copies made, and that a significant portion of Internet copying
involved P2P transactions. Private Copying 2003-2004 Decision, [2003] 28 C.P.R. (4th)
417, available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf, at 12-14.
203. Id. at 20. The Board admitted, however, that the legality of P2P was
ultimately for the courts to decide. Id. at 21.
204. Id. at 20.
205. Id.
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illegal activity. 2°6  In that case, the Canadian Recording Industry
Association ("CRIA") brought a motion against five Canadian ISPs
to compel disclosure of the identities of twenty-nine customers who
allegedly engaged in file sharing of copyrighted works.2 7 The court
announced that the test for granting an equitable bill of discovery
involved five criteria: (1) the applicant must establish a prima facie
case against the alleged wrongdoer; (2) the person from whom
discovery is sought must be involved in the matter as more than an
innocent bystander; (3) the person from whom discovery is sought
must be the only practical source of the requested information; (4) the
person from whom discovery is sought must be reasonably
compensated for expenses arising out of compliance with the
discovery order; and (5) the public interest in disclosure must
outweigh legitimate privacy concerns. 8 The court found that CRIA's
affidavit was deficient in several respects, 20 9 and that privacy concerns
trumped the public interest in disclosure. 10
The most controversial part of the opinion, however, addressed
whether CRIA had successfully established a prima facie case of
infringement. The court agreed with the Copyright Board's decision
that downloading a song for personal use fell within the private
copying exception in Canada's Copyright Act n.21 The court then went
on to say that uploading copyrighted musical files did not constitute
206. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241, 258-61 (Trial Div.)
(Can.).
207. Id. at 249. In the United States, the RIAA filed hundreds of John Doe
lawsuits against alleged file sharers, using the American version of the Canadian
motion at issue in BMG Canada. See supra note 14. Initially, the RIAA tried to
subpoena the identity of these file sharers from ISPs using 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000)
(the subpoena provision of the DMCA). However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Verizon Internet Services, 351 F.3d
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004), that a copyright holder could
only issue a § 512(h) subpoena to an ISP that stores infringing material on its servers,
and not to an ISP that merely serves as a conduit for material stored on a user's
computer. Thus, the RIAA was relegated to using John Doe lawsuits, which identify
defendants only by their numerical IP addresses, to get at alleged infringers. Kao,
supra note 7, at 418. The John Doe procedure offers greater protections for potential
defendants than § 512(h) subpoenas, which copyright holders could have abused
because of the minimal judicial oversight afforded under the DMCA. Id. at 418-19.
208. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 254.
209. Specifically, the court found that CRIA had failed to provide affidavits from
individuals with personal knowledge of the material facts, in contravention of the best
evidence rule, and had failed to establish a causal link between P2P pseudonyms and
IP addresses. Id. at 256-57.
210. The court noted that "the protection of privacy is of utmost importance to
Canadian society." Id. at 264. CRIA had gathered the evidence it presented in
October, November, and December of 2003, but had not filed the motion requesting
disclosure until February of 2004. As a result, the court found that the age of the data
made it unreliable. Id. at 266-67. Moreover, because CRIA had failed to establish a
causal link between P2P pseudonyms and IP addresses, there was an unacceptable
risk that an innocent account holder would be identified. Id.
211. Id. at 259.
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infringement either.2" 2 CRIA had put forward two grounds for
liability for uploading music: (1) authorization of copyright
infringement and (2) distribution of infringing copies.2 13
Canada punishes those who authorize infringement in much the
same way that the American system punishes contributory
infringers,2 14 but the Canadian cause of action for authorization is
generally narrower. Contributory infringement in America requires
only that the contributory infringer have knowledge of direct
infringement and materially contribute to that infringement.215
Authorizing infringement in Canada, however, requires a high degree
of intent. The Canadian Supreme Court stated in Muzak Corp. v.
Composers, Authors and Publishers Ass'n of Canada that
authorization requires that a person have sanctioned, approved, and
countenanced copyright infringement.216 In CCH Canadian, the court
noted that authorization "must be understood in its strongest
dictionary meaning."217
Furthermore, a person does not authorize infringement by merely
authorizing the use of equipment that could be used to infringe
copyright.218 Indeed, Canadian courts presume that a person who
authorizes an activity does so only as far as is consistent with the
law.219 A plaintiff may rebut this presumption, however, by showing
the existence of a certain relationship or degree of control between
the alleged authorizer and the direct infringer.22°
The BMG Canada court refused to find authorization in uploading
music to a file-sharing network. 22' Drawing on the Canadian Supreme
Court's holding in CCH Canadian, the BMG Canada court held that
there was
[no] real difference between a library that places a photocopy
machine in a room full of copyrighted material and a computer user
that places a personal copy on a shared directory linked to a P2P
service. In either case the preconditions to copying and
212. Id. at 259-60.
213. Id. at 258.
214. Under the Canadian Copyright Act, an individual may be found guilty of
direct infringement for "authorizing" the reproduction of an infringing work.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985) (Can.).
215. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). For a more detailed discussion of
contributory infringement in the P2P context, see infra notes 248-92 and
accompanying text.
216. Muzak Corp. v. Composers, Authors and Publishers Ass'n of Canada, [1953] 2
S.C.R. 182, 193 (Can.).
217. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 361
(Can.).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241,260 (Trial Div.) (Can.).
2005] 2345
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
infringement are set up but the element of authorization is
missing.
2 2
Absent a relationship of control or some positive act evincing the
intent to sanction copyright infringement, the court held that
individuals who uploaded files onto a P2P network did not authorize
the reproduction of those files.223
They also did not distribute those files, the court found, merely by
placing them in a shared directory where other file sharers could
access them. 224 Rather, distribution required some positive act by the
uploading user, such as sending out copyrighted songs or advertising
that they were available for downloading.225 This is so, under the
court's reasoning, because the Canadian Copyright Act does not give
the copyright holder the exclusive right to make his or her work
available.226 In the absence of such a right, a person who uploads
music does not violate any of the creator's exclusive rights.227
Although the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty ("WCT"), which Canada signed in 1997, includes a "making
available" right, 228 Canada has yet to ratify the WCT.2 29 Thus, it does
not currently form any part of the Canadian Copyright Act,23° making
file sharing legal, in the court's opinion, under Canadian copyright
law.
231
From a common sense perspective, the ruling in BMG Canada is
shocking. It scarcely seems logical to argue that the copying and
exchange of copyrighted songs on a network open to the general
public is somehow not copyright infringement. From a Canadian legal
perspective, however, the decision makes some sense. As the
Copyright Board noted, downloading music from P2P networks is
legal, because Canada's private copying regime does not require that
the source of the copy be noninfringing.232
Regarding uploading, in the absence of a "making available" right
for copyright holders, a user must either authorize or distribute a
copyrighted work to be liable for copyright infringement.233 The
Canadian cause of action for authorization of copyright infringement
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 260-61.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, art.
6(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), available at
http://www.wipo.org/en/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm.
229. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 261.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 259.
232. Private Copying 2003-2004 Decision, [2003] 28 C.P.R. (4th) 417, available at
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf.
233. See BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 258.
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requires a high level of intent, which the BMG Canada court declined
to find merely from the fact that a user had, intentionally or not, made
his or her songs available in a shared folder.234 In its pending appeal,
CRIA argues that the act of installing and using file-sharing software,
knowing the capacity of such software to facilitate the distribution of
copyrighted material, is sufficient for authorization.235
Given the presumption, however, that a person authorizes an
activity only so far as is in accordance with the law,236 the use of file-
sharing software alone may not be sufficient to evince intent to
sanction copyright infringement, particularly if downloading
copyrighted works from those networks is legal.237 If the Federal
Court of Appeal views P2P systems as capable of both infringing and
noninfringing uses, it seems unlikely that the mere use of file-sharing
software is enough for authorization.
This is particularly true, given that some P2P networks, like Kazaa,
place a user's downloaded songs in a shared folder by default.238 The
user may not know where the shared folder is located on her
computer, or even be aware that her files are available for
download. 239 This "passive" file sharing does not appear to evince the
high level of intent necessary for authorization of copyright
infringement.
The BMG Canada court's holding on the issue of distribution is
considerably more contentious. The court rejected CRIA's argument
that a user distributed copyrighted works by placing them in a shared
folder which other users could access.24° In the absence of positive
acts by the user, such as sending out copies of songs or advertising
their availability for download, the court held that there was no
distribution.24' CRIA maintains on appeal that placing copyrighted
works in a shared folder is tantamount to intent to distribute them, or
at the very least, intent to use them for purposes other than the
private use exempted under the Canadian Copyright Act.242 CRIA
contends that the evidence shows that the alleged infringers placed
234. Id. at 260-61.
235. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 241, appeal docketed, No. T-292-04 at *8-9
(Federal Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-
cases/file-sharing-lawsuits/criaappealnotice.pdf.
236. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 361
(Can.).
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
238. Brief of Amicus Curiae Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard
Law School at 9-10, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661-NG (D.
Mass. May 24, 2004).
239. Id.
240. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 260-61.
241. Id.
242. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 241, appeal docketed, No. T-292-04 at *7
(Federal Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-
cases/file-sharing-lawsuits/criaappealnotice.pdf.
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the files into the shared folders for the purpose of distributing them to
the public, in violation of the copyright holder's exclusive rights. 43
How successful these arguments will be on appeal depends to some
degree on how much credit the Federal Court of Appeal gives to the
passive file-sharing argument that appears to have impressed the trial
court-that is, the argument that a user does not necessarily even
know that the songs he downloaded are automatically uploaded as
well. In the case of passive file sharing, there is no intent to distribute,
and there are no positive acts of distribution.
Because of the systematically passive nature of distribution over
file-sharing networks, the presence or absence of overt acts of
distribution is largely immaterial in the P2P context. File sharers
never need to advertise or send out copies of their songs-requesting
users can find the files they want simply by searching the network for
them. 24  If the appellate court requires positive acts for distribution
on P2P networks, it is unclear whether an uploading user would ever
be liable for copyright infringement.
B. Liability for P2P Networks
Another important legal issue regarding P2P is whether the
providers of file-sharing software are liable under theories of
secondary infringement. In the United States, there is no doubt that
centralized networks are subject to contributory liability. 245 The
federal circuit courts are split, however, on whether decentralized
networks are also liable.246 In contrast, although there have been no
Canadian cases addressing secondary liability for P2P providers, the
high standard of intent for authorization of copyright infringement
makes it unlikely that such a suit would succeed in Canada.247
1. Contributory Liability in the United States
In the United States, the RIAA, faced with costly and time-
consuming litigation against individual file sharers, has attacked P2P
software providers,248 hoping to get the recent wave of decentralized
243. See id.
244. Indeed, CRIA points out in its appeal that the very nature of the file-sharing
network effectively advertises the availability of copyrighted files to millions of users.
Id. at *9.
245. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
246. Compare In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
decentralized P2P network Aimster liable for contributory infringement), cert. denied
sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004), with Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.) (holding
decentralized P2P network Grokster not liable for contributory infringement), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
247. See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
248. The high volume of illegal file sharing, and the low return from suing
individuals, makes it far more cost-effective for the RIAA to pursue litigation against
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networks to die in the same way that Napster died. In this endeavor,
the RIAA has met with varied success, depending on whether the
network at issue is centralized or decentralized, 249 and what rule of
secondary liability the particular circuit decides to adopt.250
a. Napster
Clearly, centralized P2P networks like Napster are liable for
contributory infringement in the United States, because the
architecture of their systems allows such networks to both know of
infringing files on their servers and materially contribute to illegal file-
sharing transactions.2 ' In addition, the Napster court rejected all of
the affirmative defenses that Napster asserted, effectively ruling on
the illegality of file sharing as an activity.252
This left Napster with only the Sony defense as a possible
protection. When the RIAA took Napster to court, Napster raised
this defense, arguing that its technology had "substantial
noninfringing uses" and should therefore be protected against
contributory liability.253 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with
Napster's characterization of the scope of the Sony defense.254
Rather, the court held that Sony mandated only that courts could not
impute knowledge of infringing activity to Napster simply because its
technology could be used to infringe copyright.255 In other words,
constructive knowledge of infringement, merely because of a
technology's capacity for infringing uses, was not sufficient for
contributory liability.256
The court went on to find, however, that Napster had actual
knowledge of infringing files on its servers.257 It also had the capacity,
as a centralized network, to remove those files, and to block the users
who supplied them from accessing the system.5 8 By failing to do so,
and by providing the "site and facilities" for infringement, Napster
the networks that facilitate P2P transactions. Lemley & Reese, supra note 150, at
1349.
249. Compare Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021, with Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162.
250. See supra note 246.
251. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
252. See supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
253. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
254. Id. at 1020-21.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. Specifically, the district court found evidence of actual knowledge in two
documents. One was a document authored by Sean Parker, a Napster co-founder,
speaking of the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses
because they were exchanging pirated music. The second document was from the
RIAA, informing Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files on its network. Id. at
1020 n.5.
258. Id. at 1022.
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materially contributed to that infringement, and was therefore
secondarily liable. 9
b. Aimster
The contributory infringement question is more difficult to answer
when the P2P network is decentralized, because the encryption system
will shield the network from actual knowledge of infringement. 260 The
network also cannot remove infringing material, because it does not
maintain control over indexing servers.' Not surprisingly, the federal
circuit courts are split on whether such networks are contributorily
liable for copyright infringement.262
The Seventh Circuit, on the one hand, held decentralized network
Aimster liable for contributory infringement.63 On the issue of
knowledge, the court stated that Aimster could not immunize itself
from liability through the "willful blindness" of its encryption
system.264 Rather, because Aimster knew or should have strongly
suspected that many or all of its users were copyright infringers, its
deliberate efforts to shield itself from knowledge of the full extent of
the infringement did not protect it from liability.265
On the issue of material contribution, the court concluded that
Aimster had to prove not only that its software was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, but that it was actually put to such
uses.2 66 Moreover, even if the actual use of Aimster's software was
substantially noninfringing, the court would still have required
Aimster to show that it would have been disproportionately costly for
Aimster to eliminate or reduce the remaining infringing uses before it
could escape contributory liability.267
259. Id. at 1021-22.
260. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 246.
263. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
264. Id. at 650.
265. Id.
266. In the court's words:
It is not enough, as we have said, that a product or service be physically
capable, as it were, of a noninfringing use. Aimster has failed to produce
any evidence that its service has ever been used for a noninfringing use, let
alone evidence concerning the frequency of such uses.
Id. at 653.
267. Id.
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c. Grokster
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, held in Grokster that decentralized
P2P network Grokster was not a contributory infringer. 68  In
accordance with Napster, the court required the RIAA to prove that
Grokster had actual knowledge of infringing files on its system.2 69
However, because contributory infringement requires both knowledge
and material contribution, the RIAA also had to show that Grokster
had actual knowledge of infringement at a time when it contributed to
the infringement and could have done something to stop it.
27 °
As a decentralized network, Grokster could have neither facilitated
nor impeded copyright infringement on its system.27' Indeed, the
court noted that, even if Grokster deactivated its system's computers,
users could continue to exchange files over the network with little
interruption, because Grokster did not maintain any control over
indexed files. 272 As a result, its knowledge of specific infringing files
was irrelevant, and its ability to materially contribute to infringement
nonexistent. 73  The court therefore held that Grokster was not
secondarily liable.274
d. P2P and the Sony Doctrine
Each of the three cases confronting the question of contributory
liability for P2P technology has felt it necessary to discuss whether and
to what extent the Sony doctrine may protect file-sharing networks.275
Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Sony provides the foundation
for determining contributory liability for copying technologies, and
has become central to much of the discussion surrounding liability for
P2P networks. 276  The difference in the interpretation of the Sony
268. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
269. Id. at 1162.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1163.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1157. The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari. 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004).
275. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161-62; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643,
653-54 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
540 U.S. 1107 (2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th
Cir. 2001).
276. See, e.g., Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649-53; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21; Jesse M.
Feder, Is Betamax Obselete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
in the Age of Napster, 37 Creighton L. Rev. 859 (2004); Brandon Michael Francavillo,
Comment, Pretzel Logic: The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Contributory Copyright
Infringement Mandates that the Supreme Court Revisit Sony, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 855
(2004); Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-
Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 21 (2004).
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doctrine from circuit to circuit could possibly stem from some
ambiguity in the Supreme Court's language. As a result, the scope of
Sony's protection for file-sharing technologies varies significantly
across the country.
In Napster, for example, the Ninth Circuit declined to interpret the
Sony rule as an absolute shield against liability.277 Rather, the court
held that Sony applied only to the knowledge requirement for
contributory infringement.278  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the district court's analysis, which improperly focused
on the proportion of current infringing use, as opposed to current and
future noninfringing use.27 9 The proper inquiry under Sony, the Ninth
Circuit noted, focuses on the capabilities of a product, rather than its
current actual use.280 The Napster court held, however, that the mere
capability of a product for substantial noninfringing use does not
automatically insulate the defendant from contributory liability. 2 1 It
only ensures that a court cannot impute knowledge of direct
infringement based on the mere distribution of a product with both
infringing and noninfringing uses. 28
2
On the one hand, the Napster court's analysis could be seen as a
derogation of the Sony rule, which suggests that a product capable of
substantial noninfringing uses should escape liability altogether.283
Certainly, the majority in Sony did not intend to create a rule that
only exempted products with primarily noninfringing uses, as opposed
to substantially noninfringing uses. That was more or less the
dissent's position.2 ' The focus of the Court's language on a product's
capability for substantial noninfringing use suggests that the mere
potentiality for commercially significant noninfringing use is sufficient
to shield a defendant from contributory liability.
On the other hand, the Court was clearly influenced by the fact that
the principal use of the VCR was time-shifting, which the Court found
was fair use.285 It also drew attention to the relatively small market
share of the plaintiff studios' inventory of copyrighted works, which
the Court estimated at "well below 10%.,,286 Similarly, the Napster
court was clearly influenced by the fact that the principal use of
Napster's file-sharing software was the exchange of copyrighted
musical works, and that the RIAA held the copyrights in over seventy
277. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21.
278. Id. at 1021.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. Id. at 1020-21.
282. Id.
283. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
284. Id. at 491-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 421,442.
286. Id. at 443.
2352 [Vol. 73
A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES
percent of this material.287 From the perspective of copyright holders,
these facts alone are sufficient to warrant a different analysis under
the Sony rule.
Likewise, in Aimster, the Seventh Circuit modified the Sony
doctrine to require that a product be more than merely capable of a
substantial noninfringing use.288 Rather, to escape contributory
liability, the court held that Aimster would have had to prove that its
product was actually used for noninfringing purposes.28 9 Furthermore,
even if a product is used for noninfringing purposes, if it is also used
for substantial infringing purposes, the defendant must prove that it
would have been disproportionately costly to eliminate or reduce the
infringing use.29 °
Essentially, the Seventh Circuit requires P2P providers to
vigorously police their networks. The court noted that, by eliminating
its encryption feature, Aimster could have monitored the use of its
system, and possibly escaped liability just as Sony did.291 This would
have required a substantial change in the architecture of Aimster's
system, as it would in all decentralized networks. From the
perspective of copyright holders, restructuring their systems would be
the least P2P providers could do to evidence their good faith.
From the perspective of P2P providers, however, this would stunt
the natural development and evolution of file-sharing technology.
The pure P2P model, moreover, is largely based around notions of
unregulated anonymity and free speech, to which a functioning
encryption system is essential.292  Asking P2P providers to monitor
every transaction occurring on its system is not only onerous, but also
at odds with notions of privacy and technological evolution. In
general, for proponents of file-sharing networks, attacking the
technology itself only stifles innovation.
287. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
288. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied
sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 654-55.
292. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 Va. L. Rev. 505 (2003);
John Alan Farmer, Note, The Specter of Crypto-Anarchy: Regulating Anonymity-
Protecting Peer-to-Peer Networks, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 725 (2003). This Note does
not deal directly with the many privacy issues implicated by P2P and copyright
holders' reactions to it. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Sonia K. Katyal,
The New Surveillance, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 297 (2003); Paul M. Schwartz,
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055 (2004); and Bruce P.
Smith, Legal Regulation of New Technologies: Reflections on Liberty, Control, and
the Limits of Law, 2002 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 281 (2002).
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2. Liability for Authorization in Canada
The state of the law in Canada implicitly supports the argument that
technologies are generally not to blame for the infringement that they
precipitate. Although no Canadian cases have addressed the issue of
liability for P2P networks, the cause of action for authorization of
copyright infringement in Canada is considerably narrower than
contributory infringement in the United States.293  Indeed, the
Canadian Supreme Court stated in CCH Canadian that authorizing
the mere use of equipment that could be used to infringe on copyright
is not tantamount to authorizing infringement.294 Thus, it appears
highly unlikely that a Canadian court would hold a decentralized P2P
network liable for authorization of copyright infringement. 95
C. Proposed Responses to P2P
The path that both the United States and Canada take in the future
will largely be defined by their legislative responses to P2P. Currently
on the table before both the American Congress 296 and the Canadian
Parliament 297 are proposals that will push the copyright regimes of
both countries into unexplored territory-territory where copyright
holders have greater rights and greater remedies for infringement.
293. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
294. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 361
(Can.).
295. At a time when American copyright is fighting P2P with everything it has,
Canada's liberal rules on file sharing and high standard for authorization of copyright
infringement may have established the country as a haven for the development of file-
sharing technology. See Geltzer, supra note 23, at 442-43. See generally Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic
Protections, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 223, 230 (2004); Seagrumn Smith, From Napster to
Kazaa: The Battle over Peer-to-Peer Filesharing Goes International, 2003 Duke L. &
Tech. Rev. 8, *10 (Mar. 28, 2003), at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2003DLTROO08.pdf; Jeffrey L.
Dodes, Note, Beyond Napster, Beyond the United States: The Technological and
International Legal Barriers to On-Line Copyright Enforcement, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 279, 297-98 (2002). If so, it is unclear whether the United States would be able
to enforce its copyright law against a foreign P2P provider. In the first place, simply
maintaining a website that users in several countries can access is probably
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over P2P networks. See Dodes, supra, at
298. It would be difficult to argue, in the absence of services specifically targeting
American users, that a P2P provider had "purposefully availed" itself of the benefits
and protections of American law. Id. Furthermore, even if the United States
rendered a judgment against a P2P network located in Canada, it would be
exceedingly difficult to enforce that judgment in the absence of domestic assets.
Samuelson, supra, at 230. It would also be nearly impossible to shut down or block
access to the infringing site. Smith, supra, at *10. Enjoining a website providing P2P
software would require the cooperation of the host country, usually in the form of a
locally-rendered court order. Id. However, when the host country's laws do not
criminalize the P2P provider's activity, getting such cooperation is unlikely. Id.
296. See infra notes 302-49 and accompanying text.
297. See infra notes 350-67 and accompanying text.
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Some commentators have proposed alternative compensation
schemes.298 These schemes purport, through the implementation of
levy systems, to balance creators' rights to remuneration with the
public interest in access to file-sharing technology. Although applying
a levy in the P2P context has not yet gained the support of copyright
holders,299 such alternative suggestions nevertheless provide an
intriguing counterpoint to the proposed legislation currently before
the American and Canadian governments.
1. Legislative Responses in the United States
With contributory liability for decentralized networks uncertain,30
and studies indicating that file sharing is on the rise,30 1 a flurry of bills
have come before Congress in an attempt to stem the growing P2P
tide. Each of these bills is tremendously controversial, and also
somewhat unique in terms of the copyright principles that preceded
them. Three bills in particular have garnered a significant amount of
controversy: the Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and
Expropriation Act of 2004 ("PIRATE Act"), 30 2 the Piracy Deterrence
and Education Act of 2004 ("PDEA"),3 3  and the Inducing
Infringements of Copyrights Act of 2004 ("Induce Act").3 °4
a. The PIRATEAct
On June 25, 2004, the Senate passed the PIRATE Act,30 5 a bill
which would authorize the Justice Department-as opposed to
copyright holders themselves-to file civil lawsuits against
infringers.30 6 The No Electronic Theft Act ("NET Act"), passed in
1997, authorized the Justice Department to bring criminal charges
against infringers. 7 However, in large part because of the high
burden of proof associated with criminal copyright infringement, 08 the
298. See infra notes 375-89 and accompanying text.
299. See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 260-74 and accompanying text.
301. Study: Music Piracy Rising, Wired News, Jan. 16, 2004, at
http://www.wired.comlnews/digiwood/0,1412,61943,00.html?tw=wn-story-related.
302. S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004).
303. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004).
304. S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
305. Declan McCullagh, Senate OKs Antipiracy Plan, CNET News.com, June 25,
2004, at http://news.com.com/Senate+OKs+antipiracy+plan/2100-1027_3-
5248333.html?tag=nefd.top.
306. S. 2237 § 2(a).
307. No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified
at 17 U.S.C §§ 101, 105-106; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319-2320 (2000)).
308. To convict a person of criminal copyright infringement, the government must
show that an individual acted "willfully" to infringe on copyright, and either did so for
financial gain or distributed more than $1000 in copyrighted material. §2(b), 111 Stat.
at 2678.
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Justice Department has not, to date, filed a single criminal case
against a file sharer.3"9 The PIRATE Act would solve this problem by
authorizing th3 Justice Department to bring civil suits, which require a
lower burden of proof.310 The bill is currently in the House of
Representatives.
The RIAA argues that the PIRATE Act is necessary to give
prosecutors the flexibility and discretion they need to launch an
effective campaign of deterrence against file sharing.3 ' Faced with
the magnitude of the P2P threat, proponents of the bill say that they
need the Justice Department's support to stop the piracy.3 12 The high
burden of proof associated with criminal infringement charges has
made it difficult for the federal government to aid the RIAA in its
campaign against P2P.313 The PIRATE Act would change that.
Opponents of the bill are concerned about this possibility because it
shifts the costs of infringement lawsuits from copyright holders to the
American taxpayer.314  The burden of enforcing copyright has
traditionally rested with the copyright holder. The PIRATE Act, for
the first time in history, would force a publicly funded government
institution to bear the burden of bringing lawsuits to enforce private
copyrights.315
Another concern is that the bill would allow the use of wiretaps to
investigate civil copyright claims.316 Under current wiretap law, the
RIAA, when filing its own suits, cannot intercept electronic
communications.317 The Justice Department, however, is authorized
to do so while in the course of investigating a potential federal
felony.318 If the elements of criminal copyright infringement are
proven,3 19 that infringement is a federal felony.320 Thus, opponents of
309. Declan McCullagh, "Pirate Act" Raises Civil Rights Concerns, CNET
News.com, May 26, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/Pirate+Act+raises+civil+rights+concerns/2100-1027_3-
5220480.html.
310. To assert a civil copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff must show only
"(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991).
311. Xeni Jardin, Congress Moves to Criminalize P2P, Wired News, Mar. 26, 2004,
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62830,00.html.
312. Jon Newton, Hollywood, Politics and File-Sharing Technology,
TechNewsWorld, June 2, 2004, at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/34171.html.
313. Id.
314. McCullagh, supra note 309; John P. Mello Jr., Proposed Bill Would
Criminalize File-Sharing, TechNewsWorld, Mar. 30, 2004, at
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/33262.html.
315. See Mello, supra note 314.
316. Ernest Miller, PIRATE Act-Wiretaps for Civil Copyright Infringement?,
Corante, Mar. 29, 2004, at http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/002713.html.
317. McCullagh, supra note 309.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (2000).
319. For a list of these elements, see supra note 308.
320. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
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the PIRATE Act argue that it would allow the RIAA to effectively
circumvent current wiretap law and invade individual privacy using a
method that would not otherwise be available to it.
321
b. The PDEA
On September 28, 2004, the House passed the PDEA.3 22 Under the
PDEA, file sharers who offer "for distribution to the public" $1000 or
more in copyrighted materials would be punished with prison terms of
up to three years and fines of up to $25,000.323 Additionally, the
PDEA would allocate $15 million to the Justice Department for the
criminal prosecution of copyright infringers.3 24 The bill is currently in
the Senate.
The PDEA would expand the remedies available to copyright
holders by enhancing criminal penalties for file sharers, and lowering
the burden of proof for criminal prosecutions. The bill would
essentially criminalize the uploading of large numbers of copyrighted
works, regardless of whether the works were actually downloaded or
d'stributed. Under the PDEA, prosecutors would not have to prove
that $1000 in copyrighted material had actually been downloaded;
rather, they would only need to show that such files were publicly
accessible in a shared folder.326
Proponents of the PDEA argue that it would only close a loophole
in the current law, which allows file sharers to escape criminal liability
simply because they do not distribute copyrighted works for financial
gain.327 Although file sharing can be a commercial endeavor, in that it
arguably obviates the necessity of buying a CD,32s users generally
trade files without any expectation of compensation.329 PDEA
proponents take the position that exposing file sharers to liability for
uploading brings the law in line with the reality of file sharing, and
allows viable criminal charges to deter future P2P activity.33° It also
321. See McCullagh, supra note 309; Mello, supra note 314; Miller, supra note 316.
322. Declan McCullagh, House Votes to Target P2P Pirates, CNET News.com,
Sept. 28, 2004, at http://news.com.com/House+votes+to+target+P2P+pirates/2100-
1028_3-5387682.html.
323. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 110(a) (2004).
324. Id. § 107.
325. Id. § 110(a).
326. McCullagh, supra note 322.
327. See David McGuire, House Panel Moves to Criminalize Spyware, Net Piracy,
Wash. Post Online, Sept. 8, 2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A6091-2004Sep8.html.
328. In fact, the Napster court found that file sharing was a commercial use of
copyrighted materials, because it allowed users to get for free something they would
otherwise have to pay for. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015
(9th Cir. 2001).
329. McGuire, supra note 327.
330. The RIAA argues that criminal prosecutions will be more successful in
deterring online piracy, because they would carry more weight with would-be file
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encourages the Justice Department to actually file such charges by
authorizing the expenditure of $15 million for that purpose.33'
Critics of the PDEA argue that the existing penalties for copyright
infringement are sufficiently harsh to deter, and that any further
expansion of these penalties is unjustified.332 For opponents of the
bill, expanding criminal liability and expressly criminalizing the
conduct of a large percentage of Americans is not the answer to the
P2P problem.333 Finally, critics are concerned that increasing the
Justice Department's role in file-sharing suits would protect the
entertainment industry's interests at the expense of American
taxpayers.334
c. The Induce Act
The most controversial of the three bills, the Induce Act, is
currently awaiting final review in the Senate.335 As originally worded,
the Induce Act would have expanded the doctrine of contributory
infringement to include any acts that "intentionally induce" copyright
infringement.336 The bill instantly drew fire from a broad range of
groups.337 Eventually, the controversy became so heated that the bill
was repeatedly and substantially revised.338
sharers than civil lawsuits. See id.; David McGuire, Lawmakers Push Prison for
Online Pirates, Wash. Post Online, Mar. 31, 2004, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40145-2004Mar31.html.
331. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 107 (2004).
332. See Xeni Jardin, Feds Crank Up Heat on P2P, Wired News, Mar. 31, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62895,00.html?tw=wn-tophead_3.
333. See id.; Elec. Frontier Found., Misguided Copyright Bill Moving Through
Congress, at http://www.eff.org/effector/17/33.php#I (Sept. 10, 2004). Some
opponents of the bill also argue that it criminalizes what is now lawful use of
copyrighted material. See Roy Mark, House Panel Endorses P2P Criminal Penalties,
Internetnews.com, Apr. 1, 2004, at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-
news/article.php/3334381.
334. See Jardin, supra note 332.
335. Katie Dean, Senate Shelves Induce Review, Wired News, Oct. 7, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65255,00.html.
336. S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2(g)(1) (2004).
337. See, e.g., Katie Dean, Techies Blast Induce Act, Wired News, July 23, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64315,00.html; Jefferson Graham,
Copyright Bill Poses Threat to iPod's Future, USA Today Online, July 5, 2004,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2004-07-05-induce-
act_x.htm; Jon Newton, Industry Alliance Takes Stance on Induce Act,
TechNewsWorld, July 29, 2004, at http://www.technewsworld.comlstory/35456.html;
Am. Council on Educ., Senate Targets Software Companies in Latest Effort Against
Illegal File Sharing, at http://www.acenet.edu/hena/readArticle.cfm?articlelD=867
(June 28, 2004); Ken "Caesar" Fisher, Induce Act Seeks to Eliminate Innovation, at
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20040618-3906.html (June 18, 2004).
338. For the latest revised version of the Induce Act, see Copyright Owners'
Tentative Proposal, Corante, Oct. 5, 2004, at
http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/induce-copyright-owner-tentative-prop
osal_10-5-04.pdf.
A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES
In its current form, the Induce Act would impose liability on
anyone who "manufactures, offers to the public, or provides" a P2P
product when the person knows or should know that the product is "a
substantial cause" of infringement.339 Additionally, the majority of the
product's revenue must result from infringement, or the principal uses
of the product must be infringing.34 The Induce Act explicitly states
that its provisions shall not enlarge or diminish the doctrine of
contributory infringement, or any defenses thereto.34" ' The Senate
postponed its final review of the Induce Act after negotiations
between the principal parties collapsed, but the bill's sponsors have
voiced their commitment to reaching a consensus.342
Not surprisingly, the RIAA supports the bill, which it believes
isolates bad actors-rather than bad technology-for punishment.343
These bad actors are the P2P providers who deliberately structure
their businesses to avoid secondary liability, while profiting off of the
infringement that they encourage. 3" Holding P2P companies liable
for their actions is, proponents argue, the best, and possibly only, way
to stop the rampant infringement on their networks.345
Despite substantial revisions, however, critics of the Induce Act
remain adamant that the bill would only stifle technological
innovation by exposing new and legitimate technologies to
unjustifiably increased risks of liability.3 46 Opponents are primarily
concerned about the bill's omission of the Sony doctrine. 347  As
drafted, the bill does not mention Sony's protection for products with
substantial noninfringing uses at all, although it notes that its
provisions should not diminish any defenses available to a charge of
contributory infringement.348 Without the explicit application of
339. Id. § 2(g)(1).
340. Id. Infringement under the Induce Act refers to "widespread infringement...
where such infringement results in copies or phonorecords from which further
infringing copies or phonorecords often are made widely available using a covered
peer-to-peer product." Id. § 2(g)(2)(A).
341. Id. § 2(g)(6).
342. Dean, supra note 335.
343. See Michael Colangelo, Future of Music Coalition, The Need to Strike a
Balance: INDUCE Act Attempts to Protect the Content and Attack the Technology,
at http://www.futureofmusic.org/articles/INDUCEanalysis.cfm (Aug. 2, 2004).
344. Id.
345. Grant Gross, Tech Groups Fight Copyright Infringement Bill,
ComputerWeekly.com, July 23, 2004, at
http://www.computerweekly.com/Article132192.htm.
346. Krysten Crawford, iPod in the Middle on Capitol Hill, CNN/Money, Sept. 9,
2004, at http://money.cnn.com/2004/09/O7/technology/induce; Eric Schumacher-
Rasmussen, Streamingmedia.com, Meet the New Draft, Same As the Old Draft, at
http://www.streamingmedia.com/article.asp?id=8828 (Sept. 22, 2004).
347. Tom Zeller Jr., Panel Considers Copyright Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2004, at
Cl; Jason Schultz, Elec. Frontier Found., BSA to Hatch-We're with the Tech &
Telecom Industries on Induce, at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/001956.php
(Sept. 30, 2004).
348. Copyright Owners' Tentative Proposal, supra note 338, § 2(g)(6).
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Sony's principles to P2P software, opponents worry that the Induce
Act would leave out the critical protections that the technology sector
relies upon.349
2. Legislative Responses in Canada
The Canadian government has been slower to move on P2P issues.
In October 2002, Parliament released the so-called Section 92 Report
on the operation of the current Copyright Act.35° In May 2004, after
months of hearings, Parliament issued the Bulte Report on Copyright
Reform ("Bulte Report").351 The most significant recommendation
relating to P2P in both of these reports is that Canada ratify the
WCT.352 The WCT would grant a "making available" right to
copyright holders,353 a right which does not currently form any part of
either American354 or Canadian copyright law.355 As the federal court
noted in BMG Canada, the addition of this right would most likely
make the uploading of copyrighted musical files on P2P networks
illegal.35 6 The WCT would also force Canada to substantially increase
its blank media levies in order to equalize "national treatment" and
compensate international artists, as well as Canadian artists, for lost
profits due to private copying and file sharing.357
The Bulte Report concluded by recommending that the
government introduce legislation to permit the ratification of the
WCT by November 15, 2004.358 The Canadian federal election in June
349. Open Letter from Business Software Alliance et al., to Senators Hatch and
Leahy (Sept. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/induce/20040930_BSAInduceActLetter.pdf.
350. Ministry of Indus. Intellectual Prop. Policy Directorate & Ministry of
Canadian Heritage Copyright Policy Branch, Supporting Culture and Innovation:
Report on the Provisions and Operation of the Copyright Act (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter
Section 92 Report], available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/rp/section92eng.pdf.
351. Standing Comm. on Canadian Heritage, Interim Report on Copyright Reform
(May 2004) [hereinafter Bulte Report], available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/h
erirp0l/04-mem-e.htm.
352. Section 92 Report, supra note 350, at 43-44; Bulte Report, supra note 351, at
Recommendation 1.
353. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, supra note 228, at
art. 6(1).
354. The American Copyright Act enumerates the exclusive rights it grants to
copyright holders. A "making available" right is conspicuously absent from this list.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
355. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241, 260-61 (Trial Div.)
(Can.).
356. See id.
357. Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic/Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, Response to the May 2004 Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage,
Interim Report on Copyright Reform (June 21, 2004) [hereinafter Response], at
http://www.cippic.ca/en/news/documents/Response-to BulteReport-FINAL.pdf;
Section 92 Report, supra note 350, at 39.
358. Bulte Report, supra note 351, at Recommendation 9.
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2004 interrupted this schedule, returning a Liberal government, but
with only a minority in Parliament 9.35  The Standing Committee on
Canadian Heritage has since reintroduced the report, and is hoping
for quick legislative action, including an expedited schedule for
ratification of the WCT.360
The Bulte Report argues that Canada must ratify the WCT to
honor its obligation to the World Intellectual Property Organization,
and to ensure that the Canadian Copyright Act stays modern.361
Neither the Bulte Report nor Parliament as a whole have specifically
addressed the impact of ratification on P2P, or discussed how a
"making available" right would impact the copyright regime in
general.
Some Canadian commentators are concerned about the
government's lack of discussion on this point. Copyright holders,
however, have clearly expressed their views in favor of ratification.
CRIA, for example, argues that Canada has fallen behind in the
development of Internet laws and regulation, and that this "copyright
protection gap" has affected Canadian businesses.362 To remedy the
problem, the addition of a "making available" right, and a higher
standard of copyright protection, is necessary.363
Opponents of ratification argue that the addition of a "making
available" right would expand the exclusive rights of creators without
any corresponding benefit to users.36 Opponents are also concerned
that the WCT requirement of equal national treatment would
destabilize Canada's private copying regime by forcing it to
compensate foreign, as well as Canadian, artists.365  Ratifying the
WCT "immediately," as the Bulte Report urges,366 would overlook the
controversy surrounding its proposed measures, at the expense of the
public interest in fair access to creative works.367
359. Liberals Keep "Fragile" Hold on Power, CBC News, June 29, 2004, at
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2004/06/29/canada/elxntues040629.
360. Jack Kapica, Canada Must Ratify WIPO Copyright Treaty, Committee Says,
Globe and Mail Online (Toronto), Nov. 4, 2004, at
www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20041104.gtcopyrightnov4/BNStory
/Technology.
361. Bulte Report, supra note 351, at Recommendation 1.
362. Reply Comment from The Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA),
Copyright Reform Process Reply Comments, at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incrp-prda.nsf/en/rpO0816e.html (Oct. 30, 2001).
363. Id.
364. Response, supra note 357, at 2; Kevin Massie & Laura J. Murray,
Faircopyright.ca, Critique of Recommendations Contained in the Interim Report on
Copyright Reform, at http://www.faircopyright.ca/interimreportcritique.html (Sept.
2004).
365. Id.
366. Bulte Report, supra note 351, at Recommendation 1.
367. There are several reasons, apart from those related to P2P, that some groups
oppose ratification of the WCT. For example, the WCT would require Canada to
adopt stronger copyright protection measures, including anti-circumvention
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Until Canada makes a firm decision on whether to ratify the WCT,
the private copying regime remains the primary means of
compensating creators for the activities of users. In the wake of BMG
Canada, that regime may also become-at least temporarily-the
primary means of compensating creators for P2P music file sharing.
Yet the system suffers from at least one significant weakness: the lack
of reciprocal enforcement. Canada is a net importer of copyrighted
works,36 8 yet only Canadian makers and performers benefit from the
levy system.3 69  From a global perspective, it seems unfair for
Canadians to have the right to copy international music when Canada
only compensates Canadian artists and record companies.
To equalize national treatment, however, the Copyright Board
would have to substantially raise the levy on blank media.37 ° At some
point, the burden to the consumer could become so great that the
private copying regime would no longer make economic sense. In
that case, an entirely new system would be necessary to ensure the
continued vitality of the right to make private use copies. Parliament
would again have to strike a bargain between copyright holders and
users. If copyright holders demanded compensation in return for
allowing users to make private copies, it would be difficult to envision
how the system would generate such compensation in the face of
WCT requirements.
Another concern with the private copying regime is whether it is
fair to impose the costs for P2P and private copying on the entire
population, when not all Canadians use blank media to engage in
those activities.37" ' To some degree, the Canadian Private Copying
Collective has addressed this problem in its zero-rating scheme, which
allows certain buyers to purchase blank media levy-free.372
technologies. It would also require Canada to punish the circumvention of such
protective measures. Opponents of ratification argue that this would unjustifiably
curtail the public's access to copyrighted materials. See Response, supra note 357, at
1-2; Reply Comment from Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT),
Copyright Reform Process Reply Comments, at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incrp-prda.nsf/en/rp00797e.html (Oct. 22, 2001).
368. Ruth Towse, Indus. Can., Assessing the Economic Impact of Copyright
Reform on Performers and Producers of Sound Recordings in Canada (Jan. 20, 2004),
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inippd-
dppi.nsflvwapj/towes-final-e.pdf$FILE/towes-final-e.pdf at 36.
369. See supra notes 130-31.
370. See Response, supra note 357, at 2.
371. Section 92 Report, supra note 350, at 38-39.
372. Among the buyers that qualify for levy-free blank media are educational
institutions; broadcasters; law enforcement agencies; advertising agencies; the music,
film, and video industries; courts, tribunals, and court reporters; religious
organizations; telemarketing firms; software companies; duplication facilities; medical
institutions; technology companies; conference and training companies; governments;
and other firms duplicating audio and data for business use. Canadian Private
Copying Collective, Zero-Rating & Exemptions-Zero-Rating for Buyers, at
http://cpcc.ca/english/zeroRating.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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Notwithstanding this, however, the levy affects many users who do not
engage in private copying and who also do not fall under the zero-
rating exemptions.
Additionally, although there has not been a constitutional challenge
to the levy, some critics argue that it is a form of tax, and therefore an
ultra vires exercise of the Copyright Board's jurisdiction.373 The
Copyright Board has taken the position that the levy is not a tax,
because a public body does not administer it, and it is not intended for
a public purpose.37 4 These arguments have been largely unsuccessful
in swaying Parliament or the Copyright Board to reconsider the levy.
As a result, the private copying regime is likely to remain an
important component of Canadian copyright law. Whether this
regime is capable of adequately compensating creators for P2P-
related losses is a question that the Canadian government has yet to
seriously consider. In the wake of BMG Canada, however, it is a
question that Parliament can no longer afford to ignore.
3. Alternative Proposals
The legislative proposals of both the American and Canadian
governments are obviously not the only possibilities for resolving the
P2P problem. The implementation of a tariff, specifically to redress
P2P infringement, is one possibility. A tariff system would be subject
to many of the same criticisms that confront blank media levies: for
example, charges that it does not allow for equal national treatment, is
an unconstitutional tax, and is overbroad. 375 Yet the benefits of such a
system are also apparent. An alternative compensation scheme along
these lines would allow users access to P2P technology, as well as
ensure that creators receive a fair price for their work.
It is unclear, however, who should bear the cost of any new tariff.
The Canadian Supreme Court has ruled that ISPs, as intermediaries,
are not the appropriate parties to bear these costs.37 6 The reasoning
for this decision parallels the treatment of ISPs in the United States.377
373. Private Copying 2003-2004 Decision, [2003] 28 C.P.R. (4th) 417, at 3, available
at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf.
374. Id. at 14-15.
375. See supra notes 368-74 and accompanying text.
376. SOCAN v. Canadian Ass'n of Internet Providers, 2004 S.C.C.D.J. 2155 (Sup.
Ct.) (Can.).
377. See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)
(providing safe harbors from infringement liability for ISPs who act as
intermediaries); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351
F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that ISPs acting as true intermediaries, and not
storing copyrighted material on their own servers, were not subject to the subpoena
provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that ISPs acting as a passive conduit for copyrighted
material are not liable as direct infringers).
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From a legal standpoint, this makes some sense - ISPs should not be
liable for infringing material stored on users' computers. Practically,
however, ISPs could easily add the cost of a reasonable tariff to their
customer's bills and then remit the money to the required collecting
society. Following the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in
SOCAN, however, if the government implements such a tariff,
another class of providers must bear the costs.
Some legal scholars have proposed systems that impose these costs
on providers of P2P-related goods and services. Professor Neil
Weinstock Netanel has suggested a levy upon commercial providers of
any consumer product or service whose value is "substantially
enhanced" by P2P.37 s  This would include computer hardware
manufacturers, manufacturers of electronic devices, and so on.379
Professor William Fisher has proposed a similar compensation
scheme. Under Fisher's proposed regime, copyright holders would
register with the Copyright Office, and receive a digital watermark for
their work.38° This watermark would assist the Copyright Office in
tracking transmissions of digital copies of the work, and the Copyright
Office would compensate the registered owners according to a work's
popularity.381 To pay this compensation, the government would
implement a tax on Internet and media-related goods and services.382
Although a levy of this type seems very broad, it could offer
substantial benefits over the existing enforcement regime.
Specifically, a well-functioning levy system would satisfy both
creators, who would receive compensation for their works, and users,
who would gain the freedom to exchange content on P2P networks
without the threat of legal sanctions.383
Furthermore, because the levy would be spread out over a variety
of goods and services, the additional costs to the consumer would
presumably be relatively small per good or service. A consumer of
only some of the services subject to levy payments, and therefore
presumably a consumer who engaged in less file sharing, would pay
less. This would go at least some way to making the levy fair-that is,
tailoring the levy so that it imposes the greatest costs upon the
greatest infringers.
Fisher argues that a levy system, applied to P2P, would create
substantial collateral benefits as well.3" Not only would creators
378. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1, 43 (2003).
379. Id.
380. William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
Entertainment 3 (2004), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf.
381. Id. at 3-4.
382. Id. at 17.
383. See Netanel, supra note 378, at 6, 22.
384. Fisher, supra note 380, at 4.
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receive fair compensation for use of their work, but artists would also
be less dependent on record companies for distribution.385
Consequently, consumers would enjoy a broader range of content.386
Although the price of consumer electronic equipment and Internet
access would rise somewhat, demand for these goods and services
would also rise, and society at large would benefit from a sharp
reduction in litigation and other transactional costs.387
At bottom, these levy systems function as a sort of compulsory
license. From the perspective of copyright holders, compulsory
licenses circumvent their exclusive right to distribute their works. In
his 2001 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property, country singer and songwriter Lyle
Lovett stated that "[c]ompulsory licenses should be repugnant to
those who believe in the free market and the sanctity of private
property, including intellectual property.""38 Thus, it is not surprising
that the RIAA, while it has thrown its lobbying weight behind the
legislation currently before Congress, has not supported any proposals
for alternative compensation schemes.389
As the recent flurry of proposed responses to the P2P crisis
indicates, both Canada and the United States are now standing at a
legislative and judicial crossroads. In Canada, the judiciary's
movement towards a more flexible copyright law encourages both
P2P's incorporation into the existing regime, and the adaptation of the
existing regime to fit P2P. Parliament's ambiguous response to this
judicial shift suggests a slow and measured approach to the issues, the
outcome of which is far from clear. What is clear, however, is that
Canada's response to the P2P problem has become increasingly
focused on a careful weighing of creators' and users' rights. The result
of these efforts has been the expansion of the weight accorded to the
public interest in access to file-sharing technologies.
In the United States, almost the opposite has happened. Although
there is some confusion in the courts as to whether P2P providers are
contributory infringers,3" P2P currently exists at the margins of
legality. Moreover, the push for legislative reform would almost
certainly drive P2P entirely outside of the law. If Congress passes the
three bills currently before it, the United States would be committing
itself to an intellectual property regime that measures balance in
copyright by its willingness to sacrifice some measure of user freedom
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Oversight Hearing on "Music On The Internet" Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong. 81 (May 17, 2001)
(statement of Lyle Lovett on behalf on the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/lovett_051701.htm.
389. See Netanel, supra note 378, at 19-20.
390. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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for greater enforcement of creators' rights. The RIAA would argue
that this is precisely the kind of balance necessary to ensure the
effective functioning of copyright law. If so, one thing is clear: there
will be no place for today's P2P in the American copyright regime of
the future.
III. BREAKING COPYRIGHT AND BENDING COPYRIGHT: WHAT THE
UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM THE CANADIAN APPROACH TO
P2P
When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals"
under the law, and the law could achieve the same objective-
securing rights to authors-without these millions being considered
"criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is
American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort
through our democracy to change our law?
3 9I
Both the United States and Canada acknowledge that the
underlying principle of copyright is balance.39  Yet the American
approach to the P2P crisis has become dangerously unbalanced.
When over 3000 people have been haled into court,393 the conduct of
over sixty million Americans has been characterized as criminal,394
FBI agents are raiding private homes for computer equipment,395 and
the manufacturers of P2P technology face liability simply for
providing the public with networking software,3 96 is the American
approach truly a balanced approach to copyright? Or has the
American approach to P2P failed the American public?
In granting copyright holders a dangerous and unprecedented
degree of control over the development of P2P, the American
approach to P2P is subordinating the public interest to private rights.
If the three bills before Congress pass, the result will be the
entrenchment of draconian copyright rules that suppress lawful
activity,3 97 burden the American public with the cost of prosecuting
391. Lessig, supra note 91, at 207.
392. See supra notes 35-42 and 66-73 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 14.
394. Lessig, supra note 91, at 207.
395. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
396. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied
sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004) (holding
decentralized P2P network Aimster liable for contributory infringement); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding centralized P2P
network Napster liable for contributory infringement); Inducing Infringement of
Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing liability for P2P
networks which "intentionally induce" copyright infringement).
397. Many of the uses of P2P are legal. See infra notes 402-04 and accompanying
text. The bills before Congress, however, in subjecting P2P users and providers to
expansive liability, would suppress P2P's legal uses by punishing the technology itself.
See infra notes 407-36 and accompanying text.
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P2P users, 398 and deprive the world of the benefit of a technology with
the power to revolutionize information exchange.399 Before this takes
place the United States must reconsider its approach to the P2P
problem.
In this endeavor, the Canadian approach provides important
lessons: namely, that a truly balanced approach to P2P must include
an emphasis on users' rights as a counterweight to the rights of
copyright holders. Moreover, rather than justifying outmoded
copyright rules, the law must be willing to adapt to the challenges of
new technologies, or risk stifling the development of innovative ideas.
Part III.A examines precisely how the American approach has
failed to provide a balanced response to P2P. Part III.B then argues
for the application of elements of the Canadian approach to the
American context. Finally, Part III.C considers alternative
compensation schemes, urging Congress to adopt one of these
methods, so that it can resolve the P2P crisis in a way that satisfies
both public and private interests.
A. The Failure of the American Approach
A truly balanced approach to copyright must ensure that the private
rights of creators never grow so powerful as to stifle innovation, or
override the interests of the public. Yet the three bills currently
before Congress" represent a notion of copyright that values the
exclusive rights of the creator over the public interest in access to new
and useful technologies. 401 Rather than protecting the legitimate uses
of P2P, these bills would suppress lawful use of copyrighted materials
in order to punish unlawful use. Rather than protecting the
substantial benefits of file-sharing technology, these bills would
subject P2P networks to such expansive and unprecedented liability as
to make the costs of operating a file-sharing service entirely
prohibitive.
398. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
399. See infra notes 402-36 and accompanying text.
400. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004);
Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004);
Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004, S. 2237,
108th Cong. (2004).
401. Indeed, Congress and other stakeholders, rather than differentiating the legal
and illegal uses of file sharing, have broadly condemned P2P technology. See, e,g.,
Protecting Content in a Digital Age: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Jack Valenti,
President of the MPAA) (referring to P2P networks as "file-stealing sites"), available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/022802valenti.pdf; Jardin, supra note 311
(stating that the entertainment industry is "pushing to portray P2P networks as dens
of terrorists, child pornographers and criminals," and paraphrasing Senator Orrin
Hatch, a sponsor of the PIRATE Act, characterizing P2P networks as a conspiracy to
lure children into committing illegal acts through the promise of free music, movies,
and pornography); supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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There is no doubt that P2P technology has substantial noninfringing
uses, including the expeditious and anonymous exchange of
information and ideas.402 As a result, many companies expect P2P
systems to become major technological facilitators of information
exchange for academic research and business development on the
Internet. 3 File-sharing networks also offer users the opportunity to
distribute public domain literary, musical, and audiovisual works to a
wide audience. n
Moreover, P2P functions as an alternative to market-based
proprietary control of distribution. Rather than relying on traditional
industries to distribute creative works, P2P offers users the ability to
become the producers and distributors of their own ideas and
opinions. The information exchange efficiencies of P2P networks thus
function to enhance core political values, such as autonomy,
democracy, and free speech.4 5
The American approach, typified and carried to its logical
conclusion by the proposed legislation before Congress, is willing to
sacrifice these benefits to ensure that intellectual property rights
remain inviolable. Rather than recognizing the ability of P2P to
encourage the dissemination of ideas and information, Congress has
launched an assault on both individual file sharers and P2P software
providers. This is an assault that in fact began in the judiciary, where
the courts allowed the weight of current infringing use on P2P
networks to lead them away from the crucial protections of the Sony
doctrine. Both the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, addressing
contributory infringement in the P2P context, refused to apply the
Sony rule as an absolute shield to liability,4"6 despite the fact that this
was what the Sony Court intended when it held that, to escape
liability, a product "need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses. 4 7
As some commentators have noted, the Sony case stands for the
proposition that creators cannot use copyright law to shut down a
technological innovation, simply because some uses of that innovation
402. P2P's promise to revolutionize information and exchange "stems from its
ability [to] reduce the cost of drawing information out of and inputting information
back into the network." Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law
to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 451, 502
(2002).
403. See Tanaka, supra note 170, at 60.
404. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
405. Fagin et al., supra note 402, at 502 (paraphrasing Yale Law Professor Yochai
Benkler).
406. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied
sub nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001).
407. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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are infringing.4"8 Under the Sony doctrine, the mere potential of
substantial noninfringing uses-which P2P clearly has4 9-should be
enough to protect the providers of such technology from contributory
liability. Confining the Sony analysis to the knowledge requirement
for contributory infringement, as the Napster court did,41
fundamentally misapprehends the scope of the Sony doctrine.
Likewise, requiring evidence of actual, significant noninfringing use of
a particular technology, rather than considering the technology's
capability for substantial noninfringing use, as the Aimster court did,"
is loyal to the dissent in Sony, not the majority.4 2
Notably, the Sony Court did not impose restrictions on the
evolution of controversial technology. VCRs have two distinct
functions: playing prerecorded videotapes, and recording television
programs. The plaintiffs in Sony objected to the second function only
because it was that function which enabled consumers to use the VCR
for infringing purposes.413 Sony could have easily avoided the entire
litigation by removing the record button from its VCR. The Court
must have recognized this possibility, but did not require Sony to
redesign its product to reduce or remove the capability for copyright
infringement.
The Aimster court, however, would have required Aimster to make
exactly this type of alteration to its network. The court suggested that
Aimster would have had to eliminate its encryption system and
monitor users on its network in order to escape contributory
liability.41 4 Indeed, as a general rule, the court stated that a defendant
must prove that it would have been disproportionately costly for him
to eliminate or reduce the infringing uses of his product before he
could escape liability. 15
The Aimster court's decision in this regard failed to address in a
more than perfunctory manner the substantial benefits of
encryption.4 6 Sony, in its careful consideration of the public interest
in access to new technologies, did not require such alteration. The
Seventh Circuit's addition of such a requirement places a heavy and
unfair burden on innovators, while impeding the progress of
technological improvement. It also gives copyright holders the ability
408. Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1001, 1046 (2002).
409. See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
410. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21.
411. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
412. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 491-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
correct inquiry should be whether "a significant portion of the product's use is
noninfringing").
413. See id. at 420.
414. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 654.
415. Id. at 653.
416. Encryption and online anonymity are essential in the P2P context, as they
foster free speech and protect privacy. See supra note 292.
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to control the design of new technologies, and effectively veto
innovations that could be used to threaten the integrity of their
copyrights.
The Induce Act, in adopting and even extending the expanded
liability of these cases, utterly eviscerates the Sony defense. Although
the bill states that its provisions should not enlarge the doctrine of
contributory infringement, or diminish any of its defenses, 417 the
language of the preceding sections clearly speaks otherwise.
Specifically, the Induce Act imposes liability based on an objective
reasonable person standard: If a person knows or should know that
the P2P product they offer derives a majority of its revenue from
infringement, or infringement is the principal reason that users are
attracted to the product, then such person is guilty of contributory
infringement.418
Notably, this section makes no mention of Sony's "substantial
noninfringing use" defense. In fact, the Induce Act explicitly adopts a
standard of liability based on the primary use of a P2P service,41 9 the
standard of the dissent in Sony.42 ° In contrast, the majority's standard
did not require a product's use to be primarily noninfringing, but
merely substantially noninfringing. 421 The Court also considered the
potential uses of a product alongside its actual uses.422 The Induce
Act, however, considers only actual, primary use, and thereby
circumvents the Sony defense.
The Induce Act would erase the possibilities of P2P's promise of
informational liberty by erasing P2P itself. At this time in the
development of file-sharing technology, the majority of file sharers
exchange copyrighted music. Users are therefore highly likely to
perceive any public P2P network as available primarily for that
infringing use. If they do perceive P2P networks as such, then the
network faces liability under the Induce Act.4 23 This heavy dose of
liability would be enough to cure the RIAA of P2P, but it is bad
medicine for innovation, the expeditious exchange of ideas, and the
rights of users.
The alternative that the Induce Act forces is the kind of network
that the Aimster court would have required: a non-encrypted, heavily
417. Copyright Owners' Tentative Proposal, supra note 338, § 2(g)(6).
418. Id. § 2(g)(1).
419. Id.
420. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 491-92 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 442.
422. Id. (stating that, because time-shifting satisfies the substantial noninfringing
use standard, the Court need not explore all of the different potential uses of the
VCR).
423. See Copyright Owners' Tentative Proposal, supra note 338, § 2(g)(1)(B)
(stating that contributory liability ensues for the provider of a P2P service if infringing
uses are the principal reason the majority of users are attracted to the service).
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policed network. Not only would this stunt the development of file-
sharing technology, it would also stifle free speech by depriving users
of anonymity over the network.424 Policed networks do not serve the
public interest in the unique way that anonymous, unregulated P2P
does. Instead, they exclusively serve the interests of copyright holders
by ensuring the maintenance of control over methods of digital
distribution. More to the point, forcing P2P networks to substantially
alter the architecture of their systems to avoid liability effectively
gives copyright holders a veto over the development of particular
technologies.
This amount of control is not only unprecedented, it is also
dangerous. If copyright holders had had this power in the past,
society would never have received the benefits of the radio, cable
television, or the VCR. Like these three innovations of the past,425
P2P threatens existing industry methods for the distribution of
creative works. In each historical example, the entertainment industry
reacted vociferously and argued forcefully for the proscription or
criminalization of the technology.426 Yet in each case, Congress and
the judiciary refused to comply entirely with the demands of the
industry, instead fashioning a remedy that balanced the interests of
the public with the interests of copyright holders. In the case of radio,
the solution was a low statutory licensing fee for composers, and
nothing for performers.427 Broadcasters likewise received a low
statutory licensing fee from cable TV.428 Film creators received
nothing from the makers of the VCR.42 9
None of these cases advocated circumscribing or criminalizing the
technology itself. Rather, the solution was always to legalize the
innovation and incorporate its benefits into the copyright system. In
424. As the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic/Public Interest
Advocacy Centre ("CIPPIC") has noted:
Anonymity on the Internet allows people to engage in legitimate and often
socially beneficial activities that they wouldn't otherwise engage in for fear
of embarrassment, social ostracism, retribution or persecution. For example,
communicating under a pseudonym allows individuals to explore their
creative side, human rights workers to communicate with each other,
employees to "blow the whistle" on harmful corporate practices, members of
persecuted minorities (such as gays) to share experiences, and consumers to
search for information on sensitive topics such as sexually transmitted
diseases, hair loss, or incest without concern about disclosing their identity to
others.
CIPPIC, Online Anonymity and John Doe Lawsuits-Why Is Online Anonymity
Important?, at http://www.cippic.calen/faqs-resources/online-anonymity/#faq-why-
anonymity-important (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
425. For an overview of how Congress and the courts eventually settled the
problems these innovations posed, see supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
427. See Lessig, supra note 91, at 74-75.
428. See id. at 75.
429. Id. at 77.
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the case of the VCR, this involved acknowledging that at least some
uses of the VCR would be infringing.43° Restricting access to a
technology simply because of its capacity for substantial infringing
use--despite it also having a capacity for substantial noninfringing
use-places a burden on innovation that is not justified by seeking to
prevent all instances of copyright infringement.
Yet this is precisely the zero-sum position that the United States has
taken on the P2P issue: If substantial infringement is occurring on
P2P networks, the solution is to shut them down, to bring more
lawsuits, and raise the penalties. The proceedings following the Ninth
Circuit's disposition of Napster provide a disturbingly representative
example of this approach. Some months after the Ninth Circuit
granted the RIAA's motion for a preliminary injunction against
Napster,43 1 Napster tried to get its service up and running again. It
went before the district court, stating that it had developed a
technology to block the transfer of 99.4% of identified infringing
files. 432 The court denied Napster's request, on the grounds that
99.4% was not good enough-Napster had to reduce copyright
infringement "to zero. 433
This notion of zero tolerance is unprecedented in America's
copyright history. Indeed, American copyright up until this point has
always been about balance.434 When new technologies appear and
challenge the existing copyright regime, the law has always adjusted-
and should always adjust-to protect innovation, as well as the
430. The Seventh Circuit in Aimster neatly summed up the uses of the VCR that
influenced the Sony Court's decision:
Sony's Betamax video recorder was used for three principal purposes ....
The first.., was time shifting, that is, recording a television program that
was being shown at a time inconvenient for the owner of the Betamax for
later watching at a convenient time. The second was "library building," that
is, making copies of programs to retain permanently. The third was skipping
commercials by taping a program before watching it and then, while
watching the tape, using the fast-forward button on the recorder to skip over
the commercials. The first use the Court held was a fair use .... [B]uilding a
library of taped programs was infringing because it was the equivalent of
borrowing a copyrighted book from a public library, making a copy of it for
one's personal library, then returning the original to the public library. The
third use, commercial-skipping, amounted to creating an unauthorized
derivative work .... Thus the video recorder was being used for a mixture
of infringing and noninfringing uses and the Court thought that Sony could
not demix them because once Sony sold the recorder it lost all control over
its use.
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
431. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
432. Transcript of Proceedings at 35, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (N.D.
Cal., July 11, 2001) (Nos. MDL-00-1369, C 99-5183), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/napster/transcript07ll0l.pdf.
433. Id.
434. Lessig, supra note 91, at 74.
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legitimate rights of creators.4 35  As Professor Lawrence Lessig has
forcefully argued:
If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-
sharing technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is
no way to assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in
compliance with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100
percent of handguns are used in compliance with the law. Zero
tolerance means zero p2p. [Zero tolerance] means that we as a
society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal and
beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
copyright infringements caused by p2p.436
To ensure that we do not lose file-sharing technology altogether, it is
copyright that must make the compromise, not the public interest.
Not only would the Induce Act doom the development of P2P as a
legitimate technology, but other proposed legislation would impose
similarly harsh penalties on individual file sharers, a population which
comprises huge numbers of the American public. The average college
student, for example, has 1100 infringing music files on his or her
computer.437 If those same students were to, wittingly or not, place
those files in a shared folder, under the PDEA, they could face three
years in prison.438 Even more troubling, under the PIRATE Act,
American taxpayers would bear the cost of putting these students in
jail.439
Never before in history has the public been responsible for
subsidizing the cost of enforcing private, civil actions in copyright.
These bills pose a great threat to privacy rights by co-opting the
Justice Department, with its special ability to use wiretaps, to pursue
cases of alleged civil infringement." Using public funds and
government resources to protect private interests-particularly when
those interests are adverse to the interests of the American people-is
exactly the type of unjustified expansion of copyright that Congress,
as guardian of the public interest, should oppose.
The draconian approach of these bills is deeply concerning. The
American copyright regime, traditionally a regime devoted to the
notion of copyright balance," 1 has become entirely subservient to the
interests of the entertainment industry. Congress is leading the
country down a very dangerous path, from which it will be extremely
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. McGuire, supra note 330.
438. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 110(a), (d)(1) (2004).
439. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
440. See McCullagh, supra note 309; Miller, supra note 316.
441. See Lessig, supra note 91, at 74.
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difficult to return. Before these bills pass-now, more than ever-the
United States needs to reconsider its response to the P2P crisis.
B. Rethinking P2P and Copyright: The Canadian Approach
There is another way to think about the P2P problem -a way that
Congress has utterly ignored, yet a way that does justice to the notion
of copyright balance. No more than a few hundred miles from
Washington, the emerging Canadian copyright regime has adopted
precisely the mode of balanced analysis that is so egregiously lacking
from the American discussion of P2P. The explicit focus of this
analysis on the public interest in access to P2P technology provides an
important counterweight to the exclusive focus on creators' rights
embodied in the legislation currently before Congress.
At its core, the emerging Canadian approach to copyright
emphasizes the need for a rigorous and deliberate enforcement of
balance."2 Perhaps the most potent example of this sort of judicial
policing of copyright balance is the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in CCH Canadian. The court forcefully restated the necessity
of weighing a broadly defined public interest against the limited rights
of creators.443 In analyzing the individual's right to fair dealing in
copyrighted works, the court kept a constant focus on the public
interest in access to copying technology and public domain works."4
Canada's high standard of intent for authorization of copyright
infringement also implicitly protects this access.445 The Canadian
courts have not yet had the opportunity to consider authorization in
the context of P2P providers themselves.4 Given the Canadian
Supreme Court's forceful restatement of the narrowness of this cause
of action, however, it does not appear that simply providing software
with some-or even a majority of-infringing uses would be sufficient
for authorization."7
Indeed, at least in the context of imposing liability for merely
providing software with infringing uses, any cause of action for
442. See, e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
339, 349-50 (Can.); Th6berge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R.
336,355 (Can.).
443. See CCH Canadian, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 349-50, 364-65.
444. Id. at 349-50, 371-72.
445. As the Canadian Supreme Court stated in CCH Canadian, merely providing
software which could be used to infringe on copyright does not constitute
authorization of infringement. Id. at 361. Rather, the alleged authorizer must evince
an intent to sanction and encourage infringement, sufficient to overcome the
presumption that a person who authorizes an activity does so only so far as is
consistent with the law. Id.
446. The Federal Court of Canada has, however, addressed authorization in the
context of uploading P2P users. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241,
260-61 (Trial Div.) (Can.).
447. See id.
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secondary infringement should be narrow in scope to avoid
overreaching. Canada's high standard of intent for authorization
provides the limitation on liability necessary to adequately protect
innovation. With the derogation of the Sony doctrine,448 however,
American courts grant this protection only at their discretion. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, protects P2P networks,449 while the
Seventh Circuit does not.45° Without a standardized rule of liability,
uncertainty alone will stifle the development of file-sharing
technology. Worse still, even with the Supreme Court set to decide a
standardized rule of liability in the Grokster appeal,451 without a high
level of requisite intent or control to protect innovation, contributory
liability threatens to force P2P out of existence.
Fostering innovations like P2P ultimately requires a willingness to
incorporate new technologies into the existing copyright regime, and
then adapt the regime to better fit new technologies. The Canadian
Copyright Board's December 2003 decision incorporated P2P
downloading into the country's private copying exception, and
therefore also into the levy system of compensating copyright
holders.452 Even more dramatically, the Federal Court's opinion in
BMG Canada, in stating that uploading is also legal,453 endorsed the
full incorporation of file sharing into the private copying system.
Incorporating, rather than criminalizing, technology permits the
advancement of technological innovation.
Indeed, to maintain a proper balance between users and copyright
holders, society must tolerate some level of copyright infringement.
The Canadian Copyright Board and the Federal Court in BMG
Canada have taken the first step toward recognizing the legitimacy of
P2P technology, notwithstanding the harm that it may do to copyright
in the short run, until a viable solution is reached. Recognizing P2P as
a legal technology involves accepting that some, or even currently a
majority, of the uses of that technology are infringing. Both the
Copyright Board and the federal court were willing to accept this
reality to protect the interests of users and innovators.
Although the BMG Canada court did not explicitly rely on notions
of copyright balance to reach its decision, as did the Canadian
448. See supra notes 406-22 and accompanying text.
449. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
450. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied
sub nor. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
451. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 686.
452. Private Copying 2003-2004 Decision, [2003] 28 C.P.R. (4th) 417, available at
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf.
453. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241, 259-61 (Trial Div.)
(Can.).
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Supreme Court in Thberge and CCH Canadian,454 its holding drew
heavily on the principles delineated in those cases. Indeed, the BMG
Canada court drew an analogy between a library providing
photocopiers for public use-a non-infringing activity under CCH
Canadian-and an individual file sharer making copyrighted files
available in a shared folder.455 The federal court's willingness to
consider P2P within the context of widely accepted technologies like
photocopiers, and to incorporate the CCH Canadian court's
protection of access to those technologies, is illustrative of an
emerging Canadian consciousness about the necessity of limiting the
reach of copyright to protect the rights of users.
The United States has failed to even consider the BMG Canada
court's analysis, or otherwise try to locate P2P technology within a
spectrum of useful copying or distributing technologies. The
Canadian court's analogy of P2P to library photocopiers, for example,
is a particularly cogent one. Both library photocopiers and P2P
networks are available for unregulated public use. Both traffic in
creative works, some in the public domain and some still under
copyright. Moreover, both lawfully obtain the original copies of the
works that they make available to the public: the library purchases
books or has them donated, just as it is generally the first user on a
P2P network to have purchased a song who then uploads that song for
the benefit of other users.456
When an individual user uploads files onto a P2P network, that user
is effectively uploading her own private library of works. Simply
making this library available to others, alongside copying technology,
is not significantly different from making public library works
available alongside public use photocopiers. The mere fact that the
uploading user makes those files available to other users should not be
sufficient to proscribe the activity, because American copyright law,
like Canadian copyright law, does not grant the copyright holder the
exclusive right to make her work "available.
457
Likewise, as the BMG Canada court recognized, a user is not truly
distributing creative works simply by making her private library
454. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339,
349-50; Thdberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 355
(Can.).
455. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 260.
456. Under the Canadian copyright regime, it is not only the originally, lawfully
purchased copy of a song that is legal. Downloaded copies of the original are also
considered legally obtained copies, protected under the private copying exception in
the Canadian Copyright Act. See Private Copying 2003-2004 Decision, [2003] 28
C.P.R. (4th) 417, available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf.
457. See supra notes 354-55 and accompanying text. A "making available" right is,
however, included in the WCT. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, supra note 228, at art. 6(1). Therefore, if either country were to ratify the
treaty, copyright holders would gain the exclusive right to make their work available
to the public. See supra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
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available for others to peruse.458 Certainly the uploading user has no
control over whether other individuals choose to download files from
her private library. More importantly, when a user is passively file
sharing, she is not even aware that her files are available on the
network.459 In that case, as the BMG Canada court noted, absent
positive acts evincing an intent to distribute copyrighted works, there
can be no liability. 460 Similarly, there is not the requisite level of
knowledge to impose liability for contributory infringement in the
United States.46'
Indeed, the only relevant difference between photocopiers in a
library and P2P networks is the scale of the possibility for
infringement. While library patrons can certainly photocopy an entire
book on a public use photocopier, this would be an incredibly time-
consuming task. Copying a music file off of a P2P network, on the
other hand, requires a matter of minutes at most. The mere
difference in the scale of potential copyright infringement does not,
however, render one device legal and the other illegal, as the BMG
Canada court implicitly recognized.
If that were so, a more efficient photocopier, one that would allow
an individual to photocopy an entire book within a few minutes,
would be in danger of proscription. Such a result would be patently
absurd. Additionally, the Sony doctrine protects efficient innovations
of this sort. The Sony rule, if American courts were to apply it
faithfully, would ensure that new technologies, like P2P networks or
the hypothetical "efficient photocopier," are not subject to liability
simply because they have a substantial capacity for infringing use.4 62
Rather, liability would depend on whether these technologies also had
a substantial capacity for noninfringing use.463 P2P networks would
clearly survive this type of scrutiny. 6
It is troubling, to say the least, that neither Congress nor the
American courts have undertaken an analysis along these lines.
Whether or not the United States would accept wholesale the
argument of the BMG Canada court, the dearth of alternative
analyses of this kind suggests that the American system is unwilling to
consider the substantial benefits of P2P, or the rights of its users,
458. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 260-61.
459. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
460. BMG Canada, [2004] 3 F.C.R. at 260-61.
461. Contributory infringement requires a showing of knowledge of direct
infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). This crucial element would
be lacking in the case of passive file sharing.
462. See supra notes 408-12 and accompanying text.
463. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
464. P2P's potential for substantially noninfringing-and beneficial-use is clear,
notwithstanding the fact that the majority of P2P's present use is infringing under
current American law. See supra notes 402-05 and accompanying text.
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alongside the problems that P2P currently poses for the recording
industry. Such a lopsided approach to copyright threatens user
freedom, as well as the public interest in the development of
innovative technology.
The United States should instead be open to these benefits, and to
the rigorous task of enforcing copyright balance in the P2P context. A
substantial advantage of the Canadian approach is its flexibility, which
is necessary to effectuate balance in copyright whenever new
technologies threaten existing regimes. Rather than rigidly enforcing
its copyright regime, Canada has chosen, as the United States should,
to open itself to the possibility of new innovations and alternative
methods of compensation.
C. Alternative Systems of Compensation
Exactly what type of system is appropriate to compensate copyright
holders for activity on P2P networks is a difficult question. Clearly,
however, file sharing is an issue that Congress must address, as it has
addressed the destabilizing effects of every technological innovation.
Congress's current direction, however, is the wrong one. The United
States must find a place for file sharing outside of the courts, and
outside of the jails. To preserve the benefits of P2P, this place must
be within the copyright regime, or within an alternative system of
compensation.
With the ruling in BMG Canada, the place for P2P in Canada, at
least temporarily, is under the private copying exception of the
Canadian Copyright Act. The mere subsuming of file sharing into this
exception is not, however, a fully viable solution to the P2P problem.
Parliament set up the blank media levy system to compensate creators
for lost royalties due to at-home taping only. In 1997, when it created
the system, file sharing did not yet exist. 5 To adequately compensate
creators for P2P transactions, a different system-although one based
on the same principles of public access and users' rights-is necessary.
The types of levy systems that Netanel and Fisher have proposed
present possibilities for the resolution of the P2P problem that would
benefit both users and creators.4 6  Rather than granting copyright
holders an effective veto over the evolution of file-sharing technology,
a levy system would ensure that creators received adequate
compensation for the use of their works on P2P systems.4 67 At the
same time, it would protect the public's right of access to copying
465. Indeed, Napster, the first file-sharing network, did not make its Internet debut
until May 1999. Lussier, supra note 155, at 28.
466. For an overview of these proposals, see supra notes 378-89 and accompanying
text.
467. See Fisher, supra note 380, at 4.
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technology, as well as guarantee the freedom to make private copies
and use file-sharing networks to distribute creative works.468
This is arguably a freedom that, in a fully regulated world,
government should not extend to users. The fact is, however, that
users are already exercising this freedom and not paying for it.
Moreover, they have shown their resolve to continue exercising this
freedom despite well-publicized lawsuits against file sharers.469
Certainly it is better, under these circumstances, to ensure that users
pay fairly for their actions than to take away the ability to act in this
way at all.
Yet this is precisely the result that the RIAA is so vigorously
arguing for in its support of the P2P bills currently before Congress.
In its staunch refusal to consider alternative compensation schemes,
the RIAA has consistently characterized copyright as an inalienable
property right.4 ' This analogy of intellectual property to private real
property is central to the entertainment industry's rhetoric, 47 1 but it is
also false. Intellectual property is a limited statutory monopoly for
the public's benefit.472 It does not grant absolute rights, but rather
strikes a balance between the rights of creators and rights of users.
Compulsory licenses effectuate that balance when the market fails.
When it comes to P2P, the market's failure is obvious. Copyright
holders have exercised proprietary control over creative content to
the point that they now stand in a position to veto the use and
development of P2P technology. Negotiated licensing costs would
likely be very high, assuming that copyright holders agreed to
negotiate at all-which, to date, they have not.473 The United States
has lost its copyright balance, and the only party in a position now to
bring all of the stakeholders to the table is Congress. Just as it did
with radio and cable television, Congress needs to enforce the
468. See Netanel, supra note 378, at 6, 22.
469. Indeed, rates of file sharing have increased in recent months, just as the RIAA
was haling ever-greater numbers of file sharers into court. See Study: Music Piracy
Rising, supra note 301.
470. See, e.g., supra note 388; see also Netanel, supra note 378, at 22 (quoting Hilary
Rosen, President of the RIAA, as saying, "[i]t is simply not fair to take someone
else's music and put it online for free distribution. No one wants their property taken
from them and distributed without their permission").
471. See Netanel, supra note 378, at 22.
472. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
473. See Competition, Foreign Commerce, and Infrastructure Hearing: "2nd Time
Change: The Future of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Technology" Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transportation, 108th Cong. 9 (June 23, 2004) (statement of
Michael Weiss, Chief Executive Officer, Streamcast Networks, Inc.) (stating that the
MPAA and RIAA have been unwilling to negotiate with P2P United or its members),
available at
http://commerce.senate.govlhearings/testimony.cfm?id=1247&wit-id=3577; Philip S.
Corwin, Outlook for Copyright and Digital Media Legislation in the 108th Congress,
11 SPG Media L. & Pol'y 98, 113 (2003) (pointing out that the entertainment industry
views proposals for compulsory licensing schemes as "legitimizing piracy").
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copyright bargain, ensuring compensation to creators and freedom of
access to users.
Following the ruling in BMG Canada, Canada stands in a perfect
position to become the first nation to implement an alternative system
of compensation along these lines. If the BMG Canada ruling stands,
it will force CRIA to the bargaining table, because an alternative
compensation scheme will become the industry's last resort.
Moreover, even if the ruling does not stand, it is unclear whether
CRIA will have effective legal recourse against file sharers or file-
sharing technology.4 74 Although the industry likely would not rush to
bargain immediately, instead testing out the viability of litigation
options, it would eventually exhaust these options. The logical step
would then be to work with, rather than against, P2P providers for the
development of effective payment systems.
In the United States, pursuing alternative compensation schemes
will require Congress to change its thinking about the P2P crisis.
Canada's bold stance on these issues offers an alternate analysis of
P2P that may ultimately guide Congress to the solution to the
problems that file sharing has engendered. At this critical time, as
Congress is deciding whether to stand up for the rights of users, or let
innovation fall prey to an absolutist notion of copyright, the Canadian
example must reinvigorate the discussion of copyright balance that the
United States so sorely needs.
CONCLUSION
As Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has recognized,
"[i]ntellectual property rights aren't free: They're imposed at the
expense of future creators and of the public at large. 475 If Congress
chooses to pass the P2P legislation currently before it, it will inevitably
be carving expanded protections for copyright out of the public
domain and the legitimate rights of users. This approach to the P2P
crisis has no place in a country that professes to value balance in its
copyright.
474. Even if the appellate court deems uploading illegal, CRIA may still be unable
to obtain the identities of the alleged infringers. ISPs can only provide the name of
the account holder associated with a particular IP address. BMG Canada Inc. v. John
Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241, 264 (Trial Div.) (Can.). However, the account holder may
not be the actual person engaging in the infringing activity. Id. Alternatively, the
account holder may be an institution, or may be linked to a local area network
encompassing many users. Id. at 266-67. Because this possibility is inherent in the
type of information that CRIA seeks, it is not clear that the public interest in
disclosure would ever outweigh legitimate privacy concerns. Moreover, because of
the high standard of intent necessary for authorization, it seems unlikely that a suit
against a P2P network would succeed under Canadian law. See supra notes 293-95 and
accompanying text. The Canadian legal system may therefore offer very little
recourse to copyright holders whose works are shared over P2P networks.
475. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Despite the failure of Congress thus far to consider them, there are
other solutions to the P2P problem which do not threaten the public
interest in this way. Through its explicit focus on users' rights and its
willingness to accept P2P as a legitimate technology, the Canadian
example suggests alternative approaches to the P2P crisis that both
protect the public interest and encourage the development of
innovative methods to compensate creators. It is incumbent upon
Congress to consider these alternative approaches before it makes file
sharing illegal, and ultimately destroys P2P's unique capacity to
revolutionize the exchange of information and ideas. It is probably
impossible to put the P2P genie back into the bottle, but if legislatures
start thinking outside of the copyright box to imagine creative
solutions to the problem, both users and creators can ultimately get
their wish.
Notes & Observations
